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Title: Group Incentives for Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management
Group incentives can and have been used to address a range of environmental and resource problems. These schemes base individual penalties and/or rewards on the performance of a group of individuals or firms who contribute to the environmental or resource problem. The economics literature on team incentives and public goods, as well as the literature specifically on environmental and natural resource management, provides insights into the design of group incentives. This article reviews the literature on group incentives in the context of environmental protection and natural resource policy. This literature suggests that group incentives can be effective and even efficient as environmental policy tools. However, the outcomes under group incentives will likely depend on a combination of the policy design and the nature of the internal group interactions. Within-group interactions are likely to be particularly important when policies involve thresholds so that coordination is needed to reach a cooperative equilibrium. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Resource Economics, Volume 14 is October 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2022036
PAR ID:
10346489
Author(s) / Creator(s):
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Annual Review of Resource Economics
Volume:
14
Issue:
1
ISSN:
1941-1340
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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