Abstract We address a problem that extends a fundamental classical result of continuum mechanics from the time of its inception, as well as answers a fundamental question in the recent, modern nonlinear elastic theory of dislocations. Interestingly, the implication of our result in the latter case is qualitatively different from its well-established analog in the linear elastic theory of dislocations. It is a classical result that if $$u\in C^2({\mathbb {R}}^n;{\mathbb {R}}^n)$$ u ∈ C 2 ( R n ; R n ) and $$\nabla u \in SO(n)$$ ∇ u ∈ S O ( n ) , it follows that u is rigid. In this article this result is generalized to matrix fields with non-vanishing $${\text {curl }}$$ curl . It is shown that every matrix field $$R\in C^2(\varOmega ;SO(3))$$ R ∈ C 2 ( Ω ; S O ( 3 ) ) such that $${\text {curl }}R = constant$$ curl R = c o n s t a n t is necessarily constant. Moreover, it is proved in arbitrary dimensions that a measurable rotation field is as regular as its distributional $${\text {curl }}$$ curl allows. In particular, a measurable matrix field $$R: \varOmega \rightarrow SO(n)$$ R : Ω → S O ( n ) , whose $${\text {curl }}$$ curl in the sense of distributions is smooth, is also smooth.
more »
« less
Algebraic maps constant on isomorphism classes of unpolarized abelian varieties are constant
- Award ID(s):
- 1703321
- PAR ID:
- 10348843
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Algebra & Number Theory
- Volume:
- 15
- Issue:
- 3
- ISSN:
- 1937-0652
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 711 to 727
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
More Like this
-
-
Cryptographic library developers take care to ensure their library does not leak secrets even when there are (inevitably) exploitable vulnerabilities in the applications the library is linked against. To do so, they choose some class of application vulnerabilities to defend against and hardcode protections against those vulnerabilities in the library code. A single set of choices is a poor fit for all contexts: a chosen protection could impose unnecessary overheads in contexts where those attacks are impossible, and an ignored protection could render the library insecure in contexts where the attack is feasible. We introduce RoboCop, a new methodology and toolchain for building secure and efficient applications from cryptographic libraries, via four contributions. First, we present an operational semantics that describes the behavior of a (cryptographic) library executing in the context of a potentially vulnerable application so that we can precisely specify what different attackers can observe. Second, we use our semantics to define a novel security property, Robust Constant Time (RCT), that defines when a cryptographic library is secure in the context of a vulnerable application. Crucially, our definition is parameterized by an attacker model, allowing us to factor out the classes of attackers that a library may wish to secure against. This refactoring yields our third contribution: a compiler that can synthesize bespoke cryptographic libraries with security tailored to the specific application context against which the library will be linked, guaranteeing that the library is RCT in that context. Finally, we present an empirical evaluation that shows the RoboCop compiler can automatically generate code to efficiently protect a wide range (over 500) of cryptographic library primitives against three classes of attacks: read gadgets (due to application memory safety vulnerabilities), speculative read gadgets (due to application speculative execution vulnerabilities), and concurrent observations (due to application threads), with performance overhead generally under 2% for protections from read gadgets and under 4% for protections from speculative read gadgets, thus freeing library developers from making one-size-fits-all choices between security and performance.more » « less
An official website of the United States government

