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Development of a comprehensive legal privacy framework in the United States should be based on identification of the common deficiencies of privacy policies. We attempt to delineate deficiencies by critically analyzing the privacy policies of mobile apps, application suites, social networks, Internet Service Providers, and Internet-of-Things devices. Whereas many studies have examined readability of privacy policies, few have specifically identified the information that should be provided in privacy policies but is not. Privacy legislation invariably starts a definition of personally identifiable information. We find that privacy policies’ definitions of personally identifiable information are far too restrictive, excluding information that does not itself identify a person but which can be used to reasonably identify a person, and excluding information paired with a device identifier which can be reasonably linked to a person. Legislation should define personally identifiable information to include such information, and should differentiate between information paired with a name versus information paired with a device identifier. Privacy legislation often excludes anonymous and de-identified information from notice and choice requirements. We find that privacy policies’ descriptions of anonymous and de-identified information are far too broad, including information paired with advertising identifiers. Computer science has repeatedly demonstrated that such information is reasonably linkable. Legislation should define these categories of information to align with technological abilities. Legislation should also not exempt de-identified information from notice requirements, to increase transparency. Privacy legislation relies heavily on notice requirements. We find that, because privacy policies’ disclosures of the uses of personal information are disconnected from their disclosures about the types of personal information collected, we are often unable to determine which types of information are used for which purposes. Often, we cannot determine whether location or web browsing history is used solely for functional purposes or also for advertising. Legislation should require the disclosure of the purposes for each type of personal information collected. We also find that, because privacy policies disclosures of sharing of personal information are disconnected from their disclosures about the types of personal information collected, we are often unable to determine which types of information are shared. Legislation should require the disclosure of the types of personal information shared. Finally, privacy legislation relies heavily on user choice. We find that free services often require the collection and sharing of personal information. As a result, users often have no choices. We find that whereas some paid services afford users a wide variety of choices, paid services in less competitive sectors often afford users few choices over use and sharing of personal information for purposes unrelated to the service. As a result, users are often unable to dictate which types of information they wish to allow to be shared, and which types they wish to allow to be used for advertising. Legislation should differentiate between take-it-or-leave it, opt-out, and opt-in approaches based on the type of use and on whether the information is shared. Congress should consider whether user choices should be affected by the presence of market power.
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Aligning Legal Definitions of Personal Information with the Computer Science of Identifiability
The computer science literature on identification of people using personal information paints a wide spectrum, from aggregate information that doesn’t contain information about individual people, to information that itself identifies a person. However, privacy laws and regulations often distinguish between only two types, often called personally identifiable information and de-identified information. We show that the collapse of this technological spectrum of identifiability into only two legal definitions results in the failure to encourage privacy-preserving practices. We propose a set of legal definitions that spans the spectrum. We start with anonymous information. Computer science has created anonymization algorithms, including differential privacy, that provide mathematical guarantees that a person cannot be identified. Although the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) defines aggregate information, it treats aggregate information the same as de-identified information. We propose a definition of anonymous information based on the technological possibility of logical association of the information with other information. We argue for the exclusion of anonymous information from notice and consent requirements. We next consider de-identified information. Computer science has created de-identification algorithms, including generalization, that minimize (but not eliminate) the risk of re-identification. GDPR defines anonymous information but not de-identified information, and CCPA defines de-identified information but not anonymous information. The definitions do not align. We propose a definition of de-identified information based on the reasonableness of association with other information. We propose legal controls to protect against re-identification. We argue for the inclusion of de-identified information in notice requirements, but the exclusion of de-identified information from choice requirements. We next address the distinction between trackable and non-trackable information. Computer science has shown how one-time identifiers can be used to protect reasonably linkable information from being tracked over time. Although both GDPR and CCPA discuss profiling, neither formally defines it as a form of personal information, and thus both fail to adequately protect against it. We propose definitions of trackable information and non-trackable information based on the likelihood of association with information from other contexts. We propose a set of legal controls to protect against tracking. We argue for requiring stronger forms of user choice for trackable information, which will encourage the use of non-trackable information. Finally, we address the distinction between pseudonymous and reasonably identifiable information. Computer science has shown how pseudonyms can be used to reduce identification. Neither GDPR nor CCPA makes a distinction between pseudonymous and reasonable identifiable information. We propose definitions based on the reasonableness of identifiability of the information, and we propose a set of legal controls to protect against identification. We argue for requiring stronger forms of user choice for reasonably identifiable information, which will encourage the use of pseudonymous information. Our definitions of anonymous information, de-identified information, non-trackable information, trackable information, and reasonably identifiable information can replace the over-simplified distinction between personally identifiable information versus de-identified information. We hope that this full spectrum of definitions can be used in a comprehensive privacy law to tailor notice and consent requirements to the characteristics of each type of information.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1956393
- PAR ID:
- 10349059
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC)
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893833
