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Title: Strategic investment decisions in an oligopoly with a competitive fringe: An equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints approach
Award ID(s):
2114098
PAR ID:
10350069
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
European Journal of Operational Research
ISSN:
0377-2217
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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