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Title: Enabling Design Space Exploration for RISC-V Secure Compute Environments
Cycle-level architectural simulation of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) can enable extensive design space exploration of these secure architectures. Existing architectural simulators which support TEEs are either based on hardware-level implementations or abstract analytic models. In this paper, we describe the implementation of the gem5 models necessary to run and evaluate the RISCV-based open source TEE, Keystone, and we discuss how this simulation environment opens new avenues for designing and studying these trusted environments. We show that the Keystone simulations on gem5 exhibit similar performance as the previous hardware evaluations of Keystone. We also describe three simple example use cases (understanding the reason of trusted execution slowdown, performance of memory encryption, and micro-architecture impact on trusted execution performance) to demonstrate how the ability to simulate TEEs can provide useful information about their behavior in the existing form and also with enhanced designs.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1850566 1925724
PAR ID:
10350965
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Fifth Workshop on Computer Architecture Research with RISC-V
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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