Most people in the United States recognize the reality of climate change and are concerned about its consequences, yet climate change is a low priority relative to other policy issues. Recognizing that belief in climate change does not necessarily translate to prioritizing climate policy, we examine psychological factors that may boost or inhibit prioritization. We hypothesized that perceived social norms from people’s own political party influence their climate policy prioritization beyond their personal belief in climate change. In Study 1, a large, diverse sample of Democratic and Republican participants (
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10369475
- Publisher / Repository:
- Springer Science + Business Media
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Climatic Change
- Volume:
- 173
- Issue:
- 1-2
- ISSN:
- 0165-0009
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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