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Title: Party over pandemic: Polarized trust in political leaders and experts explains public support for COVID-19 policies
Two experiments examined the polarization of public support for COVID-19 policies due to people’s (lack of) trust in political leaders and nonpartisan experts. In diverse samples in the United States (Experiment 1; N = 1,802) and the United Kingdom (Experiment 2; N = 1,825), participants evaluated COVID-19 policies that were framed as proposed by ingroup political leaders, outgroup political leaders, nonpartisan experts, or, in the United States, a bipartisan group of political leaders. At the time of the study in April 2020, COVID-19 was an unfamiliar and shared threat. Therefore, there were theoretical reasons suggesting that attitudes toward COVID-19 policy may not have been politically polarized. Yet, our results demonstrated that even relatively early in the pandemic people supported policies from ingroup political leaders more than the same policies from outgroup leaders, extending prior research on how people align their policy stances to political elites from their own parties. People also trusted experts and ingroup political leaders more than they did outgroup political leaders. Partly because of this polarized trust, policies from experts and bipartisan groups were more widely supported than policies from ingroup political leaders. These results illustrate the potentially detrimental role political leaders may play and the potential for effective leadership by bipartisan groups and nonpartisan experts in shaping public policy attitudes during crises.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2029183
PAR ID:
10372514
Author(s) / Creator(s):
 ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  
Publisher / Repository:
SAGE Publications
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
ISSN:
1368-4302
Page Range / eLocation ID:
Article No. 136843022211185
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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