Wireless systems must be resilient to jamming attacks. Existing mitigation methods require knowledge of the jammer’s transmit characteristics. However, this knowledge may be difficult to acquire, especially for smart jammers that attack only specific instants during transmission in order to evade mitigation. We propose a novel method that mitigates attacks by smart jammers on massive multi-user multiple-input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) basestations (BSs). Our approach builds on recent progress in joint channel estimation and data detection (JED) and exploits the fact that a jammer cannot change its subspace within a coherence interval. Our method, called MAED (short for MitigAtion, Estimation, and Detection), uses a novel problem formulation that combines jammer estimation and mitigation, channel estimation, and data detection, instead of separating these tasks. We solve the problem approximately with an efficient iterative algorithm. Our simulation results show that MAED effectively mitigates a wide range of smart jamming attacks without having any a priori knowledge about the attack type. 
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                            Jamming a terahertz wireless link
                        
                    
    
            Abstract As the demand for bandwidth in wireless communication increases, carrier frequencies will reach the terahertz (THz) regime. One of the common preconceived notions is that, at these high frequencies, signals can radiate with high directivity which inherently provides more secure channels. Here, we describe the first study of the vulnerability of these directional links to jamming, in which we identify several features that are distinct from the usual considerations of jamming at low frequencies. We show that the receiver’s use of an envelope detector provides the jammer with the ability to thwart active attempts to adapt to their attack. In addition, a jammer can exploit the broadband nature of typical receivers to implement a beat jamming attack, which allows them to optimize the efficacy of the interference even if their broadcast is detuned from the frequency of the intended link. Our work quantifies the increasing susceptibility of broadband receivers to jamming, revealing previously unidentified vulnerabilities which must be considered in the development of future wireless systems operating above 100 GHz. 
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                            - PAR ID:
- 10381711
- Publisher / Repository:
- Nature Publishing Group
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Nature Communications
- Volume:
- 13
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 2041-1723
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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