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Title: Satisfying complex top- k fairness constraints by preference substitutions
Given m users (voters), where each user casts her preference for a single item (candidate) over n items (candidates) as a ballot, the preference aggregation problem returns k items (candidates) that have the k highest number of preferences (votes). Our work studies this problem considering complex fairness constraints that have to be satisfied via proportionate representations of different values of the group protected attribute(s) in the top- k results. Precisely, we study the margin finding problem under single ballot substitutions , where a single substitution amounts to removing a vote from candidate i and assigning it to candidate j and the goal is to minimize the number of single ballot substitutions needed to guarantee that the top-k results satisfy the fairness constraints. We study several variants of this problem considering how top- k fairness constraints are defined, (i) MFBinaryS and MFMultiS are defined when the fairness (proportionate representation) is defined over a single, binary or multivalued, protected attribute, respectively; (ii) MF-Multi2 is studied when top- k fairness is defined over two different protected attributes; (iii) MFMulti3+ investigates the margin finding problem, considering 3 or more protected attributes. We study these problems theoretically, and present a suite of algorithms with provable guarantees. We conduct rigorous large scale experiments involving multiple real world datasets by appropriately adapting multiple state-of-the-art solutions to demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of our proposed methods.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2118458 2007935 1942913 1814595
NSF-PAR ID:
10393848
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
Volume:
16
Issue:
2
ISSN:
2150-8097
Page Range / eLocation ID:
317 to 329
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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