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Title: Vehicle lateral motion stability under wheel lockup attacks
Motivated by ample evidence in the automotive cybersecurity literature that the car brake ECUs can be maliciously reprogrammed, it has been shown that an adversary who can directly control the frictional brake actuators can induce wheel lockup conditions despite having a limited knowledge of the tire-road interaction characteristics~\cite{mohammadi2021acc}. In this paper, we investigate the destabilizing effect of such wheel lockup attacks on the lateral motion stability of vehicles from a robust stability perspective. Furthermore, we propose a quadratic programming (QP) problem that the adversary can solve for finding the optimal destabilizing longitudinal slip reference values.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2035770
PAR ID:
10395374
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
In the Fourth International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec@NDSS’22)
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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