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1. Job Displacement Insurance and (the Lack of) Consumption-Smoothing

   https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190388  

   Gerard, François; Naritomi, Joana (March 2021, American Economic Review)

   null (Ed.)

   We study the spending profile of workers who experience both a positive transitory income shock (lump-sum severance pay) and a negative permanent income shock (layoff). Using de-identified expenditure and employment data from Brazil, we show that workers increase spending at layoff by 35 percent despite experiencing a 14 percent long-term loss. We find high sensitivity of spending to cash-on-hand across consumption categories and for several sources of variation, including predictable income drops. A model with present-biased workers can rationalize our findings, and highlights the importance of the timing of benefit disbursement for the consumption-smoothing gains of job displacement insurance policies. (JEL D12, G51, J65, J63, O12) 

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2. Wage Insurance and Labor Market Trajectories

   https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20211093  

   Hyman, Benjamin G.; Kovak, Brian K.; Leive, Adam; Naff, Theodore (May 2021, AEA Papers and Proceedings)

   Wage insurance provides income support to displaced workers who find reemployment at a lower wage. We study the effects of the wage insurance provisions of the US Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program using administrative data from the state of Virginia. The program includes an age-based eligibility cutoff, allowing us to compare earnings and employment trajectories for workers whose ages at the time of displacement make them eligible or ineligible for the program. Our findings suggest that wage insurance eligibility increases short-run employment probabilities and that wage insurance and TAA training may yield similar long-run effects on employment and earnings. 

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3. Measuring Ex Ante Welfare in Insurance Markets

   https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa015  

   Hendren, Nathaniel (June 2020, The Review of Economic Studies)

   null (Ed.)

   Abstract The willingness to pay for insurance captures the value of insurance against only the risk that remains when choices are observed. This article develops tools to measure the ex ante expected utility impact of insurance subsidies and mandates when choices are observed after some insurable information is revealed. The approach retains the transparency of using reduced-form willingness to pay and cost curves, but it adds one additional sufficient statistic: the percentage difference in marginal utilities between insured and uninsured. I provide an approach to estimate this additional statistic that uses only the reduced-form willingness to pay curve, combined with a measure of risk aversion. I compare the approach to structural approaches that require fully specifying the choice environment and information sets of individuals. I apply the approach using existing willingness to pay and cost curve estimates from the low-income health insurance exchange in Massachusetts. Ex ante optimal insurance prices are roughly 30% lower than prices that maximize observed market surplus. While mandates reduce market surplus, the results suggest they would actually increase ex ante expected utility. 

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4. Embracing and Controlling Risk Dependency in Cyber Insurance Policy Underwriting

   Khalili, M.; Liu, M. and (June 2018, The Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS))

   This paper highlights how cyber risk dependencies can be taken into consideration when underwrit- ing cyber-insurance policies. This is done within the context of a base rate insurance policy framework, which is widely used in practice. Specifically, we show that there is an opportunity for an underwriter to better control the risk dependency and the risk spill-over, ultimately resulting in lower overall cyber risks across its portfolio. To do so, we consider a Service Provider (SP) and its customers as the interdependent insurer’s customers: a data breach suffered by the SP can cause business interruption to its customers. In underwriting both the SP and its customers, we show that the insurer can increase its profit by incentivizing the SP (through a discount on its premium) to invest more in security, thereby decreasing the chance of business interruption to the customers and increasing social welfare. For comparison, we also consider a scenario where the insurer underwrites only the SP’s customers (but not the SP), and receives compensation from the SP’s insurance carrier when losses are attributed to the SP. We show that the insurer cannot outperform the case where it underwrites both the SP and its customers. We use an actual cyber-insurance policy and claims data to calibrate and substantiate our analytical findings. 

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5. Consumption Insurance against Wage Risk: Family Labor Supply and Optimal Progressive Income Taxation

   https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180125  

   Wu, Chunzan; Krueger, Dirk (January 2021, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics)

   null (Ed.)

   We show that a calibrated life cycle two-earner household model with endogenous labor supply can rationalize the extent of consumption insurance against shocks to male and female wages, as estimated empirically by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) in US data. In the model, 35 percent of male and 18 percent of female permanent wage shocks pass through to consumption, compared to the empirical estimates of 32 percent and 19 percent. Most of the consumption insurance against permanent male wage shocks is provided through the presence and labor supply response of the female earner. Abstracting from this private intrahousehold income insurance mechanism strongly biases upward the welfare losses from idiosyncratic wage risk as well as the desired extent of public insurance through progressive income taxation. Relative to the standard one-earner life cycle model, the optimal degree of tax progressivity is significantly lower and the welfare gains from implementing the optimal system are cut roughly in half. (JEL D15, H21, H24, J16, J22, J31) 

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