Traffic congestion has become a serious issue around the globe, partly owing to single-occupancy commuter trips. Ridesharing can present a suitable alternative for serving commuter trips. However, there are several important obstacles that impede ridesharing systems from becoming a viable mode of transportation, including the lack of a guarantee for a ride back home as well as the difficulty of obtaining a critical mass of participants. This paper addresses these obstacles by introducing a traveler incentive program (TIP) to promote community-based ridesharing with a ride back home guarantee among commuters. The TIP program allocates incentives to (1) directly subsidize a select set of ridesharing rides and (2) encourage a small, carefully selected set of travelers to change their travel behavior (i.e., departure or arrival times). We formulate the underlying ride-matching problem as a budget-constrained min-cost flow problem and present a Lagrangian relaxation-based algorithm with a worst-case optimality bound to solve large-scale instances of this problem in polynomial time. We further propose a polynomial-time, budget-balanced version of the problem. Numerical experiments suggest that allocating subsidies to change travel behavior is significantly more beneficial than directly subsidizing rides. Furthermore, using a flat tax rate as low as 1% can double the system’s social welfare in the budget-balanced variant of the incentive program.
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Mobility Equity and Economic Sustainability Using Game Theory
In this paper, we consider a multi-modal mobility system of travelers each with an individual travel budget, and propose a game-theoretic framework to assign each traveler to a “mobility service” (each one representing a different mode of transportation). We are interested in equity and sustainability, thus we maximize the worst-case revenue of the mobility system while ensuring “mobility equity,” which we define it in terms of accessibility. In the proposed framework, we ensure that all travelers are truthful and voluntarily participate under informational asymmetry, and the solution respects the individual budget of each traveler. Each traveler may seek to travel using multiple services (e.g., car, bus, train, bike). The services are capacitated and can serve up to a fixed number of travelers at any instant of time. Thus, our problem falls under the category of many-to-one assignment problems, where the goal is to find the conditions that guarantee the stability of assignments. We formulate a linear program of maximizing worst-case revenue under the constraints of mobility equity, and we fully characterize the optimal solution.
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- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10421258
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 2023 American Control Conference
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1698-1703
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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