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We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations. For special cases of the problem with symmetric agents and additive(-like) valuation functions, approximation algorithms have been designed using approaches customized for these specific settings, and they fail to extend to more general settings. Hence, no approximation algorithm with factor independent of m is known either for asymmetric agents with additive valuations or for symmetric agents beyond additive(-like) valuations. In this paper, we extend our understanding of the NSW problem to far more general settings. Our main contribution is two approximation algorithms for asymmetric agents with additive and submodular valuations respectively. Both algorithms are simple to understand and involve non-trivial modifications of a greedy repeated matchings approach. Allocations of high valued items are done separately by un-matching certain items and re-matching them, by processes that are different in both algorithms. We show that these approaches achieve approximation factors of O(n) and O(n log n) for additive and submodular case respectively, which is independent of the number of items. For additive valuations, our algorithm outputs an allocation that also achieves the fairness property of envy-free up to one item (EF1). Furthermore, we show that the NSW problem under submodular valuations is strictly harder than all currently known settings with an e/(e-1) factor of the hardness of approximation, even for constantly many agents. For this case, we provide a different approximation algorithm that achieves a factor of e/(e-1), hence resolving it completely.
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Graphical House Allocation
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning n houses (or items) to n agents according to their preferences. A key criteria in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a generalization of this problem wherein the agents are placed along the vertices of a graph (corresponding to a social network), and each agent can only experience envy towards its neighbors. Our goal is to minimize the aggregate envy among the agents as a natural fairness objective, i.e., the sum of the envy value over all edges in a social graph. When agents have identical and evenly-spaced valuations, our problem reduces to the well-studied problem of linear arrangements. For identical valuations with possibly uneven spacing, we show a number of deep and surprising ways in which our setting is a departure from this classical problem. More broadly, we contribute several structural and computational results for various classes of graphs, including NP-hardness results for disjoint unions of paths, cycles, stars, or cliques; we also obtain fixed-parameter tractable (and, in some cases, polynomial-time) algorithms for paths, cycles, stars, cliques, and their disjoint unions. Additionally, a conceptual contribution of our work is the formulation of a structural property for disconnected graphs that we call separability which results in efficient parameterized algorithms for finding optimal allocations.
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- PAR ID:
- 10443104
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- AAMAS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 161–169
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocatingmindivisible items amongnasymmetric agents with submodular valuations. TheNSWis a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of agents’ valuations. For special cases of the problem with symmetric agents and additive(-like) valuation functions, approximation algorithms have been designed using approaches customized for these specific settings, and they fail to extend to more general settings. Hence, no approximation algorithm with a factor independent ofmwas known either for asymmetric agents with additive valuations or for symmetric agents beyond additive(-like) valuations before this work. In this article, we extend our understanding of theNSWproblem to far more general settings. Our main contribution is two approximation algorithms for asymmetric agents with additive and submodular valuations. Both algorithms are simple to understand and involve non-trivial modifications of a greedy repeated matchings approach. Allocations of high-valued items are done separately by un-matching certain items and re-matching them by different processes in both algorithms. We show that these approaches achieve approximation factors ofO(n) andO(nlogn) for additive and submodular cases, independent of the number of items. For additive valuations, our algorithm outputs an allocation that also achieves the fairness property of envy-free up to one item (EF1). Furthermore, we show that theNSWproblem under submodular valuations is strictly harder than all currently known settings with an\(\frac{\mathrm{e}}{\mathrm{e}-1}\)factor of the hardness of approximation, even for constantly many agents. For this case, we provide a different approximation algorithm that achieves a factor of\(\frac{\mathrm{e}}{\mathrm{e}-1}\), hence resolving it completely.more » « less
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
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