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This content will become publicly available on July 7, 2024

Title: Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification
We study the problem of online binary classification where strategic agents can manipulate their observable features in predefined ways, modeled by a manipulation graph, in order to receive a positive classification. We show this setting differs in fundamental ways from classic (non-strategic) online classification. For instance, whereas in the non-strategic case, a mistake bound of ln |H| is achievable via the halving algorithm when the target function belongs to a known class H, we show that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a mistake bound o(Δ) in the strategic setting, where Δ is the maximum degree of the manipulation graph (even when |H| = O(Δ)). We complement this with a general algorithm achieving mistake bound O(Δ ln |H|). We also extend this to the agnostic setting, and show that this algorithm achieves a Δ multiplicative regret (mistake bound of O(Δ · OPT + Δ · ln |H|)), and that no deterministic algorithm can achieve o(Δ) multiplicative regret. Next, we study two randomized models based on whether the random choices are made before or after agents respond, and show they exhibit fundamental differences. In the first, fractional model, at each round the learner deterministically chooses a probability distribution over classifiers inducing expected values on each vertex (probabilities of being classified as positive), which the strategic agents respond to. We show that any learner in this model has to suffer linear regret. On the other hand, in the second randomized algorithms model, while the adversary who selects the next agent must respond to the learner's probability distribution over classifiers, the agent then responds to the actual hypothesis classifier drawn from this distribution. Surprisingly, we show this model is more advantageous to the learner, and we design randomized algorithms that achieve sublinear regret bounds against both oblivious and adaptive adversaries.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2212968 2216899
NSF-PAR ID:
10451968
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Page Range / eLocation ID:
22 to 58
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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