Side-channel analysis is a non-invasive form of attack that reveals the secret key of the cryptographic circuit by analyzing the leaked physical information. The traditional brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks target the weakness in the encryption algorithm, whereas side-channel attacks use statistical models such as differential analysis and correlation analysis on the leaked information gained from the cryptographic device during the run-time. As a non-invasive and passive attack, the side-channel attack brings a lot of difficulties for detection and defense. In this work, we propose a key update scheme
as a countermeasure for power and electromagnetic analysis-based attacks on the cryptographic device. The proposed countermeasure utilizes a secure coprocessor to provide secure key generation and storage in a trusted environment. The experimental results show that the proposed key update scheme can mitigate side-channel attacks significantly.
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This content will become publicly available on September 24, 2024
Towards Cloud-based Infrastructure for Post-Quantum Cryptography Side-channel Attack Analysis
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) refers to cryptographic algorithms that are thought to be secure against a cryptanalytic attack by a quantum computer. Before PQC algorithms can be widely deployed to replace the current standards such as the RSA algorithm, they need to be rigorously evaluated theoretically and practically. In this work, we present a cloud-based infrastructure being developed for performing side-channel analysis on PQC algorithms for the research community. Multiple types of side-channel attacks, such as timing attacks, power attacks, and electromagnetic attacks can be applied on different types of devices, such as FPGA devices and microcontrollers. An automated tool flow is being developed that can run executables on the target devices, collect traces (e.g., power consumption waveforms and electromagnetic radiation signals), perform leakage assessment (using Test Vector Leakage Assessment), and generate analysis reports. Remote users access the infrastructure through a web portal by uploading the hardware or software implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Side-channel attack and leakage analysis are performed on the given implementation. Finally, the user is informed for downloading the analysis report from the portal.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2213738
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10476139
- Publisher / Repository:
- IEEE
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 2023 IEEE Design Methodologies Conference
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Miami, Florida, USA
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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