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Title: Quantum Cryptography for Enhanced Network Security: A Comprehensive Survey of Research, Developments, and Future Directions
With the ever-growing concern for internet security, the field of quantum cryptography emerges as a promising solution for enhancing the security of networking systems. In this paper, 20 notable papers from leading conferences and journals are reviewed and categorized based on their focus on various aspects of quantum cryptography, including key distribution, quantum bit commitment, post-quantum cryptography, and counterfactual quantum key distribution. The paper explores the motivations and challenges of employing quantum cryptography, addressing security and privacy concerns along with existing solutions. Secure key distribution, a critical component in ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information over a network, is emphasized in the discussion. The survey examines the potential of quantum cryptography to enable secure key exchange between parties, even when faced with eavesdropping, and other applications of quantum cryptography. Additionally, the paper analyzes the methodologies, findings, and limitations of each reviewed study, pinpointing trends such as the increasing focus on practical implementation of quantum cryptography protocols and the growing interest in post-quantum cryptography research. Furthermore, the survey identifies challenges and open research questions, including the need for more efficient quantum repeater networks, improved security proofs for continuous variable quantum key distribution, and the development of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, showing future directions for the field of quantum cryptography.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1946442 2100115 2209638
PAR ID:
10478489
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
IEEE
Date Published:
Journal Name:
IEEE Big Data 2023
Page Range / eLocation ID:
10
Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
QKD Networking Quantum Cryptography Security
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Sorrento, Italy
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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