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Title: Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses
A large body of research has investigated responses to artificial scenarios (e.g., trolley problem) where maximizing beneficial outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) conflicts with adherence to moral norms (deontology). The CNI model is a computational model that quantifies sensitivity to consequences for the greater good ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction versus action ( I) in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. Expanding on a description of the CNI model, the current article provides (a) a comprehensive review of empirical findings obtained with the CNI model, (b) an analysis of their theoretical implications, (c) a discussion of criticisms of the CNI model, and (d) an overview of alternative approaches to disentangle multiple factors underlying moral-dilemma responses and the relation of these approaches to the CNI model. The article concludes with a discussion of open questions and new directions for future research. Public AbstractHow do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2310159
PAR ID:
10495245
Author(s) / Creator(s):
 ;  
Publisher / Repository:
SAGE Publications
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Personality and Social Psychology Review
Volume:
29
Issue:
1
ISSN:
1088-8683
Format(s):
Medium: X Size: p. 32-80
Size(s):
p. 32-80
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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