This study investigated whether misalignment between an individual and their community in partisan identity predicted psychological and behavioral distancing from local COVID-19 norms. A nationally representative sample of Republicans and Democrats provided longitudinal data in April ( N = 3,492) and June 2020 ( N = 2,649). Democrats in Republican communities reported especially heightened better-than-average estimates, perceiving themselves as more adherent to and approving of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI; e.g., mask wearing) than their community. Democrats’ better-than-average estimates reflected high approval and behavior in Republican communities and substantial norm underestimation. Republicans in Democratic communities did not evidence worse-than-average estimates. In longitudinal models, injunctive norms only predicted NPI behavior when individual and community partisan identity were aligned. The strong personal approval-behavior association did not depend on misalignment; there were no effects of descriptive norms. Normative messages may have limited efficacy for a sizable subpopulation in politically polarized contexts, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
This content will become publicly available on March 1, 2025
Critical Race Theory (CRT) has become a flashpoint of elite political discord, yet how Americans actually perceive CRT is unclear. We theorize that Republican elites utilized a strong framing strategy to re-define CRT as an “empty signifier” representing broader racial and cultural grievances. Using a survey and a pre-registered experiment among U.S. adults (N = 19,060), we find that this strategy worked. Republicans exhibit more familiarity with CRT and hold more negatively valenced (and wide ranging) sentiments toward CRT, relative to Democrats. Moreover, compared to teaching the legacy of racism in schools, Republicans are significantly more opposed to teaching CRT while Democrats express greater uncertainty. Our findings suggest that by framing CRT as a broad term that envelopes many grievances (including those beyond the scope of CRT), Republican elites have shaped a subset of Americans’ understanding of and attitudes toward CRT.
more » « less- PAR ID:
- 10497714
- Publisher / Repository:
- Cambridge University Press
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics
- Volume:
- 9
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 2056-6085
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 157 to 181
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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