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Controller Area Network (CAN) is the de-facto standard in-vehicle network system. Despite its wide adoption by automobile manufacturers, the lack of security design makes it vulnerable to attacks. For instance, broadcasting packets without authentication allows the impersonation of electronic control units (ECUs). Prior mitigations, such as message authentication or intrusion detection systems, fail to address the compatibility requirement with legacy ECUs, stealthy and sporadic malicious messaging, or guaranteed attack detection. We propose a novel authentication system called ShadowAuth that overcomes the aforementioned challenges by offering backward-compatible packet authentication to ECUs without requiring ECU firmware source code. Specifically, our authentication scheme provides transparent CAN packet authentication without modifying existing CAN packet definitions (e.g., J1939) via automatic ECU firmware instrumentation technique to locate CAN packet transmission code, and instrument authentication code based on the CAN packet behavioral transmission patterns. ShadowAuth enables vehicles to detect state-of-the-art CAN attacks, such as bus-off and packet injection, responsively within 60ms without false positives. ShadowAuth provides a sound and deployable solution for real-world ECUs.
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PhyAuth: Physical-Layer Message Authentication for ZigBee Networks
ZigBee is a popular wireless communication standard for Internet of Things (IoT) networks. Since each ZigBee network uses hop-by-hop network-layer message authentication based Yanchao Zhang Arizona State University Star E E Tree E E R E Mesh E E R E E E on a common network key, it is highly vulnerable to packetC E injection attacks, in which the adversary exploits the compromised network key to inject arbitrary fake packets from any spoofed address to disrupt network operations and conCoordinator C R E sume the network/device resources. In this paper, we present PhyAuth, a PHY hop-by-hop message authentication frameE E C R R E E E R R C R E E Router E E E End Device Figure 1: ZigBee network topologies. work to defend against packet-injection attacks in ZigBee networks. The key idea of PhyAuth is to let each ZigBee E The coordinator acts as a central node responsible for mantransmitter embed into its PHY signals a PHY one-time password (called POTP) derived from a device-specific secret key and an efficient cryptographic hash function. An authentic POTP serves as the transmitter’s PHY transmission permission for the corresponding packet. PhyAuth provides three schemes to embed, detect, and verify POTPs based on different features of ZigBee PHY signals. In addition, PhyAuth involves lightweight PHY signal processing and no change to the ZigBee protocolstack. Comprehensive USRP experiments confirm that PhyAuth can efficiently detect fake packets with very low false-positive and false-negative rates while having a negligible negative impact on normal data transmissions.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2055751
- PAR ID:
- 10501432
- Publisher / Repository:
- USENIX
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Security Symposium
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Anaheim, CA, USA
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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