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This content will become publicly available on July 9, 2024

Title: IP Protection in TinyML
Tiny machine learning (TinyML) is an essential component of emerging smart microcontrollers (MCUs). However, the protection of the intellectual property (IP) of the model is an increasing concern due to the lack of desktop/server-grade resources on these power-constrained devices. In this paper, we propose STML, a system and algorithm co-design to Secure IP of TinyML on MCUs with ARM TrustZone. Our design jointly optimizes memory utilization and latency while ensuring the security and accuracy of emerging models. We implemented a prototype and benchmarked with 7 models, demonstrating STML reduces 40% of model protection runtime overhead on average.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2238635 1916926 2229427
NSF-PAR ID:
10504253
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
IEEE
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2023 60th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 6
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
San Francisco, CA, USA
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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