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Title: A 10.33 μJ/encryption Homomorphic Encryption Engine in 28nm CMOS with 4096-degree 109-bit Polynomials for Resource-Constrained IoT Clients
Award ID(s):
2111751
PAR ID:
10521236
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
IEEE ESSCIRC
Date Published:
ISBN:
979-8-3503-0420-6
Page Range / eLocation ID:
193 to 196
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Lisbon, Portugal
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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