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Attribute-based encryption (ABE) generalizes public-key encryption and enables fine-grained control to encrypted data. However, ABE upends the traditional trust model of public-key encryption by requiring a single trusted authority to issue decryption keys. If an adversary compromises the central authority and exfiltrates its secret key, then the adversary can decrypt every ciphertext in the system. This work introduces registered ABE, a primitive that allows users to generate secret keys on their own and then register the associated public key with a “key curator” along with their attributes. The key curator aggregates the public keys from the different users into a single compact master public key. To decrypt, users occasionally need to obtain helper decryption keys from the key curator which they combine with their own secret keys. We require that the size of the aggregated public key, the helper decryption keys, the ciphertexts, as well as the encryption/decryption times to be polylogarithmic in the number of registered users. Moreover, the key curator is entirely transparent and maintains no secrets. Registered ABE generalizes the notion of registration-based encryption (RBE) introduced by Garg et al. (TCC 2018), who focused on the simpler setting of identity-based encryption. We construct a registered ABE scheme that supports an a priori bounded number of users and policies that can be described by a linear secret sharing scheme (e.g., monotone Boolean formulas) from assumptions on composite-order pairing groups. Our approach deviates sharply from previous techniques for constructing RBE and only makes black-box use of cryptography. All existing RBE constructions (a weaker notion than registered ABE) rely on heavy non-black-box techniques. The encryption and decryption costs of our construction are comparable to those of vanilla pairing-based ABE. Two limitations of our scheme are that it requires a structured reference string whose size scales quadratically with the number of users (and linearly with the size of the attribute universe) and the running time of registration scales linearly with the number of users. Finally, as a feasibility result, we construct a registered ABE scheme that supports general policies and an arbitrary number of users from indistinguishability obfuscation and somewhere statistically binding hash functions.
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Dynamic Collusion Bounded Functional Encryption from Identity-Based Encryption
Functional Encryption is a powerful notion of encryption in which each decryption key is associated with a function such that decryption recovers the function evaluation . Informally, security states that a user with access to function keys (and so on) can only learn (and so on) but nothing more about the message. The system is said to be -bounded collusion resistant if the security holds as long as an adversary gets access to at most function keys. A major drawback of such "statically" bounded collusion systems is that the collusion bound must be declared at setup time and is fixed for the entire lifetime of the system. We initiate the study of "dynamically" bounded collusion resistant functional encryption systems which provide more flexibility in terms of selecting the collusion bound, while reaping the benefits of statically bounded collusion FE systems (such as quantum resistance, simulation security, and general assumptions). Briefly, the virtues of a dynamically bounded scheme can be summarized as: (i) [Fine-grained individualized selection.] It lets each encryptor select the collusion bound by weighing the trade-off between performance overhead and the amount of collusion resilience. (ii) [Evolving encryption strategies.] Since the system is no longer tied to a single collusion bound, thus it allows to dynamically adjust the desired collusion resilience based on any number of evolving factors such as the age of the system, or a number of active users, etc. (iii) [Ease and simplicity of updatability.] None of the system parameters have to be updated when adjusting the collusion bound. That is, the same key can be used to decrypt ciphertexts for collusion bound as well as . We construct such a dynamically bounded functional encryption scheme for the class of all polynomial-size circuits under the general assumption of Identity-Based Encryption.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1908611
- PAR ID:
- 10345425
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Eurocrypt 2022
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 736-763
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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