This paper studies a satellite transponder’s communication channel, in which there exist multiple-user terminals, who compete for limited radio resources to meet their own data rate needs. Because inter-user interference limits on the satellite transponder’s performance, the transponder’s power-control system needs to coordinate all its users to reduce interference and maximizes overall performance. A non-cooperative Differential Game (DG) is set up to model the users’ competition in a transponder’s communication channel. Each user’s utility function is a trade-off between transmission data rate and power consumption. Nash Equilibrium (NE) is defined to be the solution of the DG model. The optimality condition of NE is derived to be a set of Differential Algebraic Equations (DAE). An algorithm based on minimizing Hamiltonians is developed to solve the DAE system. The numerical solution of the DG model provides the transponder’s power control system with each user’s power-control strategy at the equilibrium.
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This content will become publicly available on June 12, 2025
Stackelberg Differential Game Analysis of Energy Efficiency for Satellite Communication Subsystems
The multiple-user terminals in a satellite transponder’s communication channel compete for limited radio resources to meet their own data rate needs. Because inter-user interference limits on the satellite transponder’s performance, the transponder’s power-control system needs to coordinate all its users to reduce interference and maximizes overall performance of this channel. This paper studies Stackelberg competition among the asymmetrical users in a transponder’s channel, where some users called leader have priority to choose their power control strategy, but other users called followers have to optimize their power control strategy with given leader’s controls. A Stackelberg Differential Game (SDG) is set up to model the Stackelberg competition in a transponder’s communication channel. Each user’s utility function is a trade-off between transmission data rate and power consumption. The dynamics of the system is the changing of channel gain. The optimality condition of Stackelberg equilibrium of leaders and followers is a set of Differential Algebraic Equations (DAE) with an imbedded control strategies from its counterpart. In order to solve for Stackelberg equilibrium, an algorithm based on optimizing leaders’ and followers’ Hamiltonians iteratively is developed. The numerical solution of the SDG model provides the transponder’s power control system with each user’s power-control strategy at the Stackelberg equilibrium.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1900984
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10522831
- Publisher / Repository:
- INTERNATIONAL ASET INC.
- Date Published:
- ISSN:
- 2368-5433
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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