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Title: Maintaining Information Freshness under Jamming
In UAV communication with a ground control station, mission success requires maintaining the freshness of the received information, especially when the communication faces hostile interference. We model this problem as a game between a UAV transmitter and an adversarial interferer. We prove that in contrast with the Nash equilibrium, multiple Stackelberg equilibria could arise. This allows us to show that reducing interference activity in the Stackelberg game is achieved by higher sensitivity of the transmitter in the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy to network parameters relative to the Nash equilibrium strategy. All the strategies are derived in closed form and we establish the condition for when multiple strategies arise.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1717041
NSF-PAR ID:
10109345
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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