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Title: RackBlox: A Software-Defined Rack-Scale Storage System with Network-Storage Co-Design
Award ID(s):
1919044
PAR ID:
10525145
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
ACM
Date Published:
ISBN:
9798400702297
Page Range / eLocation ID:
182 to 199
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Koblenz Germany
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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