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From infancy, children show heightened interest in events that are impossible or improbable, relative to likely events. Do young children represent impossible and improbable events as points on a continuum of possibility, or do they instead treat them as categorically distinct? Here, we compared 2- and 3-y-old children’s learning (N = 335) following nearly identical events that were equi-probable, improbable, or impossible. We found that children learned significantly better following impossible than possible events, no matter how unlikely. We conclude that young children distinguish between the impossible and the merely improbable.
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Expecting the Unexpected: Infants Use Others’ Surprise to Revise Their Own Expectations
Abstract Human infants show systematic responses to events that violate their expectations. Can they also revise these expectations based on others’ expressions of surprise? Here we ask whether infants (N = 156, mean = 15.2 months, range: 12.0–18.0 months) can use an experimenter’s expression of surprise to revise their own expectations about statistically probable vs. improbable events. An experimenter sampled a ball from a box of red and white balls and briefly displayed either a surprised or an unsurprised expression at the outcome before revealing it to the infant. Following an unsurprised expression, the results were consistent with prior work; infants looked longer at a statistically improbable outcome than a probable outcome. Following a surprised expression, however, this standard pattern disappeared or was even reversed. These results suggest that even before infants can observe the unexpected events themselves, they can use others’ surprise to expect the unexpected. Starting early in life, human learners can leverage social information that signals others’ prediction error to update their own predictions.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2019567
- PAR ID:
- 10532543
- Publisher / Repository:
- MIT Press
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Open Mind
- Volume:
- 8
- ISSN:
- 2470-2986
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 67 to 83
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1162/opmi_a_00117
