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Title: Morally-Relevant Theory of Mind is Related to Viewing Gender Inequalities as Unacceptable
Previous research has shown that morally-relevant theory of mind enables children to avoid blaming a peer for an accidental transgression. The current study investigated whether this form of theory of mind helps children recognize that gender inequalities are unfair and create negative emotional experiences. Further, the study examined this ability across three perspectives (for themselves, for those who have been advantaged by inequality, and for those who have been disadvantaged by inequality). Participants were 141 children (MAge = 6.67 years, 49% female, 32% ethnic/racial minority) recruited from the mid-Atlantic region of the U.S. Experience with the negative consequences of gender bias and more advanced mental state understanding was associated with more negative evaluations of gender inequalities and more neutral attributions of others’ emotions. These findings shed light on the role of different forms of mental state understanding in children’s evaluations of inequalities based on gender.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1728918
PAR ID:
10534715
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Elsevier
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Cognitive development
ISSN:
0885-2014
Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
theory of mind, gender inequality, emotions, fairness, resource allocation Morally-
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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