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This work presents a new framework for a competitive evolutionary game between monoclonal antibodies and signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer. The framework is based on a novel dynamical model that takes into account the dynamic progression of signalling pathways, resistance mechanisms and monoclonal antibody therapies. This game involves a scenario in which signalling pathways and monoclonal antibodies are the players competing against each other, where monoclonal antibodies use Brentuximab and Pembrolizumab dosages as strategies to counter the evolutionary resistance strategy implemented by the signalling pathways. Their interactions are described by the dynamical model, which serves as the game’s playground. The analysis and computation of two game-theoretic strategies, Stackelberg and Nash equilibria, are conducted within this framework to ascertain the most favourable outcome for the patient. By comparing Stackelberg equilibria with Nash equilibria, numerical experiments show that the Stackelberg equilibria are superior for treating signalling pathways and are critical for the success of monoclonal antibodies in improving oesophageal cancer patient outcomes.
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Regularized Conventions: Equilibrium Computation as a Model of Pragmatic Reasoning
We present a game-theoretic model of pragmatics that we call ReCo (for Regularized Conventions). This model formulates pragmatic communication as a game in which players are rewarded for communicating successfully and penalized for deviating from a shared, “default” semantics. As a result, players assign utterances context-dependent meanings that jointly optimize communicative success and naturalness with respect to speakers’ and listeners’ background knowledge of language. By using established game-theoretic tools to compute equilibrium strategies for this game, we obtain principled pragmatic language generation procedures with formal guarantees of communicative success. Across several datasets capturing real and idealized human judgments about pragmatic implicature, ReCo matches, or slightly improves upon, predictions made by Iterated Best Response and Rational Speech Acts models of language understanding.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2212310
- PAR ID:
- 10535721
- Publisher / Repository:
- Association for Computational Linguistics
- Date Published:
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 2944 to 2955
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Mexico City, Mexico
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2024.naacl-long.163
