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Abstract Transfers of resources in dictator games vary significantly by the characteristics of recipients. We focus on social norms and demonstrate that variation in the recipient changes both giving and injunctive norms and may offer an explanation for differences in giving. We elicit generosity using dictator games, and social norms using incentivized coordination games, with two different recipient types: an anonymous student and a charitable organization. A within-subjects design ensures that other factors are held constant. Our results show that differences in giving behavior are closely related to differences in social norms of giving across contexts. Controlling for individual differences in beliefs about the norm, subjects do not weight compliance with the norms in the student recipient or charity recipient dictator game differently. These results suggest that the impact of context on giving co-occurs with an impact on social norms.
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Social sanctions in response to injunctive norm violations
Injunctive social norms are societal standards for how people are expected to behave. When individuals transgress these norms, they face social sanctions for their behavior. These sanctions can take many forms, ranging from verbal or nonverbal reactions and from disapproval to ostracism. We review the stable characteristics and situational variables that affect a bystander’s tendency to enact social sanctions against someone who violates an injunctive social norm. Stable characteristics include the bystander’s extraversion, altruism, the belief that others can change their behavior, and their cultural background. Situational factors include the extent to which the violated norm implicates the bystander, the social hierarchies among the bystander and transgressor, the presence of additional bystanders, and (when applicable) the bystander’s relationship to the victim of the norm violation. We also discuss the costs that a bystander can incur by attempting to enact social sanctions. We conclude with a discussion of the application of social sanctions to enforce pro-social social norms.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2017045
- PAR ID:
- 10544597
- Publisher / Repository:
- Current Opinion in Psychology
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Current Opinion in Psychology
- Volume:
- 59
- Issue:
- C
- ISSN:
- 2352-250X
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 101850
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101850
