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Innovation policy can be a crucial component of governments' responses to crises. Because speed is a paramount objective, crisis innovation may also require different policy tools than innovation policy in non-crisis times, raising distinct questions and tradeoffs. In this paper, we survey the U.S. policy response to two crises where innovation was crucial to a resolution: World War II and the COVID-19 pandemic. After providing an overview of the main elements of each of these efforts, we discuss how they compare, and to what degree their differences reflect the nature of the central innovation policy problems and the maturity of the U.S. innovation system. We then explore four key tradeoffs for crisis innovation policy---top-down vs. bottom-up priority setting, concentrated vs. distributed funding, patent policy, and managing disruptions to the innovation system---and provide a logic for policy choices. Finally, we describe the longer-run impacts of the World War II effort and use these lessons to speculate on the potential long-run effects of the COVID-19 crisis on innovation policy and the innovation system.
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The World War II crisis innovation model: What was it, and where does it apply?
World War II was one of the most acute emergencies in U.S. history, and the first where mobilizing science and technology was a major part of the government response. The U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) led a far-ranging research effort to develop technologies and medical treatments that not only helped win the war, but also transformed civilian life. Scholars and policymakers have appealed to the wartime approach as a template for other problems, typically focusing on the Manhattan Project, but overlooking the broader OSRD effort of which atomic fission and dozens of other programs were a part. In this paper we bring OSRD into focus, describe how it worked, and explore what insights its experience offers today. We argue that several aspects of OSRD continue to be relevant, especially in crises, while also cautioning on the limits to generalizing from World War II to other settings.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1951470
- PAR ID:
- 10550450
- Publisher / Repository:
- Research Policy
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Research Policy
- Volume:
- 52
- Issue:
- 9
- ISSN:
- 0048-7333
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 104845
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2023.104845
