Title: Crisis Innovation Policy from World War II to COVID-19
Innovation policy can be a crucial component of governments' responses to crises. Because speed is a paramount objective, crisis innovation may also require different policy tools than innovation policy in non-crisis times, raising distinct questions and tradeoffs. In this paper, we survey the U.S. policy response to two crises where innovation was crucial to a resolution: World War II and the COVID-19 pandemic. After providing an overview of the main elements of each of these efforts, we discuss how they compare, and to what degree their differences reflect the nature of the central innovation policy problems and the maturity of the U.S. innovation system. We then explore four key tradeoffs for crisis innovation policy---top-down vs. bottom-up priority setting, concentrated vs. distributed funding, patent policy, and managing disruptions to the innovation system---and provide a logic for policy choices. Finally, we describe the longer-run impacts of the World War II effort and use these lessons to speculate on the potential long-run effects of the COVID-19 crisis on innovation policy and the innovation system. more »« less
Gross, Daniel P.; Sampat, Bhaven N.
(, AEA Papers and Proceedings)
null
(Ed.)
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers, researchers, and journalists have made comparisons to World War II. In 1940, a group of top US science administrators organized a major coordinated research effort to support the Allied war effort, including significant investments in medical research that yielded innovations like mass-produced penicillin, antimalarials, and a flu vaccine. We draw on this episode to discuss the economics of crisis innovation. Since the objectives of crisis R&D are different than ordinary R&D, we argue that appropriate R&D policy in a crisis requires going beyond the standard Nelson-Arrow framework for research policy.
Gross, Daniel P; Sampat, Bhaven N
(, Research Policy)
World War II was one of the most acute emergencies in U.S. history, and the first where mobilizing science and technology was a major part of the government response. The U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) led a far-ranging research effort to develop technologies and medical treatments that not only helped win the war, but also transformed civilian life. Scholars and policymakers have appealed to the wartime approach as a template for other problems, typically focusing on the Manhattan Project, but overlooking the broader OSRD effort of which atomic fission and dozens of other programs were a part. In this paper we bring OSRD into focus, describe how it worked, and explore what insights its experience offers today. We argue that several aspects of OSRD continue to be relevant, especially in crises, while also cautioning on the limits to generalizing from World War II to other settings.
One of the most commanding powers of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is to compel inventions into secrecy, withholding patent rights and prohibiting disclosure, to prevent technology from leaking to foreign competitors. This paper studies the impacts of compulsory secrecy on firm invention and the wider innovation system. In World War II, USPTO issued secrecy orders to more than 11,000 patent applications, which it rescinded en masse at the end of the war. Compulsory secrecy caused implicated firms to shift their patenting away from treated classes, with effects persisting through at least 1960. It also restricted commercialization and impeded follow-on innovation. Yet it appears it was effective at keeping sensitive technology out of public view. The results provide insight into the effectiveness of compulsory secrecy as a regulatory strategy and into the roles, and impacts, of formal intellectual property in the innovation system. This paper was accepted by Toby Stuart, entrepreneurship and innovation. Funding: This work was supported by Harvard Business School (Division of Research and Faculty Development) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (Innovation Policy Grant). This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant 1951470]. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4457 .
Rivera, R.; Rosenbaum, J. E.; Quispe, W.
(, Epidemiology and Infection)
null
(Ed.)
Abstract Deaths are frequently under-estimated during emergencies, times when accurate mortality estimates are crucial for emergency response. This study estimates excess all-cause, pneumonia and influenza mortality during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic using the 11 September 2020 release of weekly mortality data from the United States (U.S.) Mortality Surveillance System (MSS) from 27 September 2015 to 9 May 2020, using semiparametric and conventional time-series models in 13 states with high reported COVID-19 deaths and apparently complete mortality data: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington. We estimated greater excess mortality than official COVID-19 mortality in the U.S. (excess mortality 95% confidence interval (CI) 100 013–127 501 vs. 78 834 COVID-19 deaths) and 9 states: California (excess mortality 95% CI 3338–6344) vs. 2849 COVID-19 deaths); Connecticut (excess mortality 95% CI 3095–3952) vs. 2932 COVID-19 deaths); Illinois (95% CI 4646–6111) vs. 3525 COVID-19 deaths); Louisiana (excess mortality 95% CI 2341–3183 vs. 2267 COVID-19 deaths); Massachusetts (95% CI 5562–7201 vs. 5050 COVID-19 deaths); New Jersey (95% CI 13 170–16 058 vs. 10 465 COVID-19 deaths); New York (95% CI 32 538–39 960 vs. 26 584 COVID-19 deaths); and Pennsylvania (95% CI 5125–6560 vs. 3793 COVID-19 deaths). Conventional model results were consistent with semiparametric results but less precise. Significant excess pneumonia deaths were also found for all locations and we estimated hundreds of excess influenza deaths in New York. We find that official COVID-19 mortality substantially understates actual mortality, excess deaths cannot be explained entirely by official COVID-19 death counts. Mortality reporting lags appeared to worsen during the pandemic, when timeliness in surveillance systems was most crucial for improving pandemic response.
AbstractFrom Operation Warp Speed to the lipid mRNA vaccine, the COVID-19 pandemic has been a watershed moment for technological development, production, and implementation. The scale and pace of innovation and global collaboration has likely not been experienced since World War II. This article highlights some of the engineering accomplishments that occurred during the pandemic. We provide a broad overview of the technological achievements in vaccine design, antibody engineering, drug repurposing, and rapid diagnostic testing. We also discuss what the future of these technologies and the future of large-scale collaborations might look like moving forward. Graphic abstract
Gross, Daniel P, and Sampat, Bhaven N. Crisis Innovation Policy from World War II to COVID-19. Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10550451. Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy 1. Web. doi:10.1086/719253.
Gross, Daniel P, & Sampat, Bhaven N. Crisis Innovation Policy from World War II to COVID-19. Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, 1 (). Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10550451. https://doi.org/10.1086/719253
Gross, Daniel P, and Sampat, Bhaven N.
"Crisis Innovation Policy from World War II to COVID-19". Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy 1 (). Country unknown/Code not available: NBER Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/719253.https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10550451.
@article{osti_10550451,
place = {Country unknown/Code not available},
title = {Crisis Innovation Policy from World War II to COVID-19},
url = {https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10550451},
DOI = {10.1086/719253},
abstractNote = {Innovation policy can be a crucial component of governments' responses to crises. Because speed is a paramount objective, crisis innovation may also require different policy tools than innovation policy in non-crisis times, raising distinct questions and tradeoffs. In this paper, we survey the U.S. policy response to two crises where innovation was crucial to a resolution: World War II and the COVID-19 pandemic. After providing an overview of the main elements of each of these efforts, we discuss how they compare, and to what degree their differences reflect the nature of the central innovation policy problems and the maturity of the U.S. innovation system. We then explore four key tradeoffs for crisis innovation policy---top-down vs. bottom-up priority setting, concentrated vs. distributed funding, patent policy, and managing disruptions to the innovation system---and provide a logic for policy choices. Finally, we describe the longer-run impacts of the World War II effort and use these lessons to speculate on the potential long-run effects of the COVID-19 crisis on innovation policy and the innovation system.},
journal = {Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy},
volume = {1},
publisher = {NBER Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy},
author = {Gross, Daniel P and Sampat, Bhaven N},
}
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