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Abstract Misinformation exposure can cause inaccurate beliefs and memories. These unwanted outcomes can be mitigated when misinformation reminders—veracity-labeled statements that repeat earlier-read false information—appear before corrections with true information. The present experiment used eye tracking to examine the role of attention while encoding corrective details in the beneficial effects of reminder-based corrections. Participants read headlines in a belief-updating task that included a within-subjects manipulation of correction format. They first rated the familiarity and veracity of true and false headlines (Phase 1). Then, they read true headlines that corrected false headlines or affirmed true headlines (Phase 2). The true headlines appeared (1) without veracity labels, (2) with veracity labels, or (3) with misinformation reminders and veracity labels. Finally, participants re-rated the veracity of the Phase 1 headlines and rated their memory for whether those headlines were corrected in Phase 2 (Phase 3). Reminder-based corrections led to the greatest reduction in false beliefs, best high confidence recognition of corrections, and earliest eye fixations to the true details of corrections during encoding in Phase 2. Corrections remembered with the highest confidence rating were associated with more and earlier fixations to true details in correction statements in Phase 2. Collectively, these results suggest that misinformation reminders directed attention to corrective details, which improved encoding and subsequent memory for veracity information. These results have applied implications in suggesting that optimal correction formats should include features that direct attention to, and thus support encoding of, the contrast between false and true information.
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Debunking Three Myths About Misinformation
Recent years have seen a surge in research on why people fall for misinformation and what can be done about it. Drawing on a framework that conceptualizes truth judgments of true and false information as a signal-detection problem, the current article identifies three inaccurate assumptions in the public and scientific discourse about misinformation: (1) People are bad at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias is not a driving force in judgments of misinformation, and (3) gullibility to false information is the main factor underlying inaccurate beliefs. Counter to these assumptions, we argue that (1) people are quite good at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias in responses to true and false information is pervasive and strong, and (3) skepticism against belief-incongruent true information is much more pronounced than gullibility to belief-congruent false information. These conclusions have significant implications for person-centered misinformation interventions to tackle inaccurate beliefs.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2040684
- PAR ID:
- 10555809
- Publisher / Repository:
- SAGE Publications
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Volume:
- 34
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 0963-7214
- Format(s):
- Medium: X Size: p. 36-42
- Size(s):
- p. 36-42
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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