Misinformation is widespread, but only some people accept the false information they encounter. This raises two questions: Who falls for misinformation, and why do they fall for misinformation? To address these questions, two studies investigated associations between 15 individual-difference dimensions and judgments of misinformation as true. Using Signal Detection Theory, the studies further investigated whether the obtained associations are driven by individual differences in truth sensitivity, acceptance threshold, or myside bias. For both political misinformation (Study 1) and misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines (Study 2), truth sensitivity was positively associated with cognitive reflection and actively open-minded thinking, and negatively associated with bullshit receptivity and conspiracy mentality. Although acceptance threshold and myside bias explained considerable variance in judgments of misinformation as true, neither showed robust associations with the measured individual-difference dimensions. The findings provide deeper insights into individual differences in misinformation susceptibility and uncover critical gaps in their scientific understanding.
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Debunking Three Myths About Misinformation
Recent years have seen a surge in research on why people fall for misinformation and what can be done about it. Drawing on a framework that conceptualizes truth judgments of true and false information as a signal-detection problem, the current article identifies three inaccurate assumptions in the public and scientific discourse about misinformation: (1) People are bad at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias is not a driving force in judgments of misinformation, and (3) gullibility to false information is the main factor underlying inaccurate beliefs. Counter to these assumptions, we argue that (1) people are quite good at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias in responses to true and false information is pervasive and strong, and (3) skepticism against belief-incongruent true information is much more pronounced than gullibility to belief-congruent false information. These conclusions have significant implications for person-centered misinformation interventions to tackle inaccurate beliefs.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2040684
- PAR ID:
- 10555809
- Publisher / Repository:
- SAGE Publications
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Volume:
- 34
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 0963-7214
- Format(s):
- Medium: X Size: p. 36-42
- Size(s):
- p. 36-42
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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