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Title: Provable Policy Gradient Methods for Average-Reward Markov Potential Games
We study Markov potential games under the infinite horizon average reward criterion. Most previous studies have been for discounted rewards. We prove that both algorithms based on independent policy gradient and independent natural policy gradient converge globally to a Nash equilibrium for the average reward criterion. To set the stage for gradient-based methods, we first establish that the average reward is a smooth function of policies and provide sensitivity bounds for the differential value functions, under certain conditions on ergodicity and the second largest eigenvalue of the underlying Markov decision process (MDP). We prove that three algorithms, policy gradient, proximal-Q, and natural policy gradient (NPG), converge to an ϵ-Nash equilibrium with time complexity O(1ϵ2), given a gradient/differential Q function oracle. When policy gradients have to be estimated, we propose an algorithm with ~O(1mins,aπ(a|s)δ) sample complexity to achieve δ approximation error w.r.t~the ℓ2 norm. Equipped with the estimator, we derive the first sample complexity analysis for a policy gradient ascent algorithm, featuring a sample complexity of ~O(1/ϵ5). Simulation studies are presented.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2038625
PAR ID:
10563429
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS) 2024
Date Published:
Volume:
38
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Valencia, Spain
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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