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Abstract In response to some resource inequalities, children give priority to moral concerns. Yet, in others, children show ingroup preferences in their evaluations and resource allocations. The present study built upon this knowledge by investigating children's and young adults’ (N = 144; 5–6‐year‐olds,Mage = 5.83,SDage= .97; 9–11‐year‐olds,Mage = 10.74,SDage= .68; and young adults,Mage = 19.92,SDage = 1.10) evaluations and allocation decisions in a science inequality context. Participants viewed vignettes in which male and female groups received unequal amounts of science supplies, then evaluated the acceptability of the resource inequalities, allocated new boxes of science supplies between the groups, and provided justifications for their choices. Results revealed both children and young adults evaluated inequalities of science resources less negatively when girls were disadvantaged than when boys were disadvantaged. Further, 5‐ to 6‐year‐old participants and male participants rectified science resource inequalities to a greater extent when the inequality disadvantaged boys compared to when it disadvantaged girls. Generally, participants who used moral reasoning to justify their responses negatively evaluated and rectified the resource inequalities, whereas participants who used group‐focused reasoning positively evaluated and perpetuated the inequalities, though some age and participant gender findings emerged. Together, these findings reveal subtle gender biases that may contribute to perpetuating gender‐based science inequalities both in childhood and adulthood.
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This content will become publicly available on February 1, 2026
Not all punishment is equal: The effect of punishment severity on children’s social evaluations.
Punishment is a key mechanism to regulate selfish behaviors and maintain cooperation in a society. However, children often show mixed evaluations about third-party punishment. The current work asked how punishment severity might shape children's social judgments. In two studies, 5- to 10-year-old children heard about a punisher who took different numbers of items from a transgressor and evaluated the punisher's behavior and moral character. In Study 1 (n=68), when the transgression was relatively mild (i.e., unfair sharing), children across ages evaluated taking no items from the unfair sharer ("no punishment") most positively, while evaluating taking three items ("harshest punishment") most negatively. In Study 2 (n=68), when the transgression was more serious (i.e., stealing), younger children evaluated taking two items ("equality-establishing punishment") more positively than older children, while evaluating taking none most negatively. However, children became more likely to evaluate equality-establishing punishment negatively with age. Overall, the current results show that punishment severity is a key factor underlying children's third-party punishment judgments. The current research extends work on moral development by showing how children conceptualize the severity of punishment.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2044360
- PAR ID:
- 10571010
- Publisher / Repository:
- Developmental Psychology
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Developmental Psychology
- Volume:
- 61
- Issue:
- 2
- ISSN:
- 0012-1649
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 311 to 322
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- child development, fairness, morality, social cognition, third-party punishment
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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