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Abstract With age, people increasingly emphasize intent when judging transgressions. However, people often lack information about intent in everyday settings; further, they may wonder about reasons underlying pro‐social acts. Three studies investigated 4‐to‐6‐year‐olds', 7‐to‐9‐year‐olds', and adults' (data collected 2020–2022 in the northeastern United States, totaln = 669, ~50% female, predominantly White) desire for information about why behaviors occurred. In Study 1, older children and adults exhibited more curiosity about transgressions versus pro‐social behaviors (ds = 0.52–0.63). Younger children showed weaker preferences to learn about transgressions versus pro‐social behaviors than did older participants (d = 0.12). Older children's emphasis on intent, but not expectation violations, drove age‐related differences (Studies 2–3). Older children may target intent‐related judgments specifically toward transgressions, and doing so may underlie curiosity about wrongdoing. 

Abstract Although children exhibit curiosity regarding science, questions remain regarding how children evaluate others' curiosity and whether evaluations differ across domains that prioritize faith (e.g., religion) versus those that value questioning (e.g., science). In Study 1 (n = 115 5‐ to 8‐year‐olds; 49% female; 66% White), children evaluated actors who were curious, ignorant and non‐curious, or knowledgeable about religion or science; curiosity elicited relatively favorable moral evaluations (ds > .40). Study 2 (n = 62 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds; 48% female; 63% White) found that these evaluations generalized to behaviors, as children acted more pro‐socially and less punitively toward curious, versus not curious, individuals ( = .37). These findings (data collected 2020–2022) demonstrate children's positive moral evaluations of curiosity and contribute to debates regarding overlap between scientific and religious cognition. 

Abstract Adults often respond negatively toward children with incarcerated parents. Yet, the developmental foundations for such negativity remain unclear. Two studies (N = 331 U.S. residents; plurality White; plurality male; data collected between Winter 2019 and Spring 2021) addressed this topic. Study 1 probed 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds' and 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds' inferences about peers with and without incarcerated parents. Children reported less certainty that peers with, versus without, incarcerated parents possess moral beliefs. Study 2 showed that among older children, inferences about parental absence did not fully account for this pattern of results. Across studies, children behaved less generously toward peers with, versus without, incarcerated parents. These studies illuminate how early socio‐moral judgment may contribute to negativity toward children with incarcerated parents. 

Punishment can serve as a form of communication: People use punishment to express information to its recipients and interpret punishment between third parties as having communicative content. Prior work on the expressive function of punishment has primarily investigated the capacity of punishment in general to communicate a single type of message – e.g., that the punished behavior violated an important norm. The present work expands this framework by testing whether different types of punishment communicate different messages. We distinguish between person-oriented punishments, which seek to harm the recipient, and action-oriented punishments, which seek to undo a harmful action. We show that people interpret action-oriented punishments, compared to person-oriented punishments, to indicate that the recipient will change for the better (Study 1). The communicative theory can explain this finding if people understand action-oriented punishment to send a message that is more effective than person-oriented punishment at causing such a change. Supporting this explanation, inferences about future behavior track the recipients' beliefs about the punishment they received, rather than the punisher's intentions or the actual punishment imposed (Study 2). Indeed, when actual recipients of a person-oriented punishment believed they received an action-oriented punishment and vice versa, predictions of future behavior tracked the recipients' beliefs rather than reality, and judgments about what the recipients learned from the punishments mediated this effect (Study 3). Together, these studies demonstrate that laypeople think different types of punishment send different messages to recipients and that these messages are differentially effective at bringing about behavioral changes. 

Stories about redemption are ubiquitous; people emphasize moral improvement when describing their own lives and, often, others' lives as well. However, psychology does not yet have a well-developed literature concerning redemption, and developmental science has not addressed questions regarding how perceptions of redemption might emerge or change between childhood and adulthood. To the extent that past research has spoken to this issue, it has pointed in contradictory directions. Two different theories—focusing on essentialism and on optimism—make two different developmental predictions about how and why judgments of redemption might change with age. Integrating these perspectives, we propose a novel theory of redemption that puts work on essentialism and optimism in conversation with each other. The theory of redemption further highlights the role of social inputs (e.g., experiences with their own and others' moral change) as mechanisms that can lead children to hold more redemptive views than do adults. The theory of redemption accounts for previous findings in developmental science and makes novel predictions regarding the social inputs and consequences of redemptive views. 

Punishment is a key mechanism to regulate selfish behaviors and maintain cooperation in a society. However, children often show mixed evaluations about third-party punishment. The current work asked how punishment severity might shape children's social judgments. In two studies, 5- to 10-year-old children heard about a punisher who took different numbers of items from a transgressor and evaluated the punisher's behavior and moral character. In Study 1 (n=68), when the transgression was relatively mild (i.e., unfair sharing), children across ages evaluated taking no items from the unfair sharer ("no punishment") most positively, while evaluating taking three items ("harshest punishment") most negatively. In Study 2 (n=68), when the transgression was more serious (i.e., stealing), younger children evaluated taking two items ("equality-establishing punishment") more positively than older children, while evaluating taking none most negatively. However, children became more likely to evaluate equality-establishing punishment negatively with age. Overall, the current results show that punishment severity is a key factor underlying children's third-party punishment judgments. The current research extends work on moral development by showing how children conceptualize the severity of punishment. 

Legal theorists have argued that incarceration and alternative sanctions are incommensurable – that is, beyond some crime severity threshold, replacing incarceration with alternative sanctions can never yield a sentence that people will view as appropriate (Kahan, 1996). To test whether laypeople hold this view, we elicited lay judgments about appropriate sentences for four common types of federal crimes in two different conditions: One in which participants could impose only a term of imprisonment and another in which they could impose imprisonment along with alternative sanctions. Laypeople imposed significantly less imprisonment in the latter condition and significant quantities of alternative, non-carceral sanctions. Consistent with the view that imprisonment is commensurable with other sanctions, and particularly with restraint-based sanctions, laypeople substituted supervised release almost one-for-one for imprisonment. In addition, they increased imprisonment and supervised release at similar rates as crime severity increased. Next, using individual-level sentencing data from similar cases in the federal courts, we found that judges’ sentencing decisions showed similar relationships between crime severity and both imprisonment and supervised release. However, laypeople imposed dramatically larger fines and more hours of community service than did federal judges, and laypeople tied the use of these alternative sanctions more directly to crime severity. These findings suggest that federal judges do not view fines and community service as commensurable with incarceration. As a result, current criminal sentencing practices deviate from community views by placing excessive emphasis on incarceration and paying insufficient attention to alternative sanctions. 

Can moral rules change? We tested 129 children from the United States to investigate their beliefs about whether God could change widely shared moral propositions (e.g., “it’s not okay to call someone a mean name”), controversial moral propositions (e.g., “it’s not okay to tell a small lie to help someone feel happy”), and physical propositions (e.g., “fire is hotter than snow”). We observed an emerging tendency to report that God's ability to change morality is limited, suggesting that children across development find some widely shared aspects of morality to be impossible to change. Some beliefs did shift over development, however: 4- to 6-year-olds did not distinguish among God’s ability to change widely shared moral, controversial moral, and physical propositions, whereas 7- to 9-year-olds became increasingly confident that God could change physical and controversial moral propositions. Critically, however, younger children and older children alike reported that widely shared aspects of morality could not be altered. According to participants, not even God could change fundamental moral principles. 

Humans behave more prosocially toward ingroup (vs. outgroup) members. This preregistered research examined the influence of God concepts and memories of past behavior on prosociality toward outgroups. In Study 1 (n = 573), participants recalled their past kind or mean behavior (between-subjects) directed toward an outgroup. Subsequently, they completed a questionnaire assessing their views of God. Our dependent measure was the number of lottery entries given to another outgroup member. Participants who recalled their kind (vs. mean) behavior perceived God as more benevolent, which in turn predicted more generous allocation to the outgroup (vs. ingroup). Study 2 (n = 281) examined the causal relation by manipulating God concepts (benevolent vs. punitive). We found that not only recalling kind behaviors but perceiving God as benevolent increased outgroup generosity. The current research extends work on morality, religion, and intergroup relations by showing that benevolent God concepts and memories of past kind behaviors jointly increase outgroup generosity. 

Two experiments investigated how evaluations of intergroup curiosity differed depending on whether people placed responsibility for their learning on themselves or on outgroup members. In Study 1, participants ( n = 340; 51% White-American, 49% Black-American) evaluated White actors who were curious about Black culture and placed responsibility on outgroup members to teach versus on themselves to learn. Both Black and White participants rated the latter actors as more moral, and perceptions of effort mediated this effect. A follow-up preregistered study ( n = 513; 75% White-American) asked whether perceptions of greater effort cause greater perceptions of moral goodness. Replicating Study 1, participants rated actors as more moral when they placed responsibility on themselves versus others. Participants also rated actors as more moral when they exerted high versus low effort. These results clarify when and why participants view curiosity as morally good and help to strengthen bridges between work on curiosity, moral cognition, and intergroup relations.