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  • An LLM-Assisted Easy-to-Trigger Backdoor Attack on Code Completion Models: Injecting Disguised Vulnerabilities against Strong Detection
Title: An LLM-Assisted Easy-to-Trigger Backdoor Attack on Code Completion Models: Injecting Disguised Vulnerabilities against Strong Detection
In Proceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security), Philadelphia, PA, USA, August 14-16, 2024.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2326341 2302689 2308730 2319277
PAR ID:
10578177
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
USENIX Association
Date Published:
ISBN:
978-1-939133-44-1
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Philadelphia, USA
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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    Private Set Union (PSU) protocol allows parties, each hold- ing an input set, to jointly compute the union of the sets without revealing anything else. In the literature, scalable PSU protocols follow the “split-execute-assemble” paradigm (Kolesnikov et al., ASIACRYPT 2019); in addition, those fast protocols often use Oblivious Transfer as building blocks. Kolesnikov et al. (ASIACRYPT 2019) and Jia et al. (USENIX Security 2022), pointed out that certain security issues can be introduced in the “split-execute-assemble” paradigm. In this work, surprisingly, we observe that the typical way of invoking Oblivious Transfer also causes unnecessary leakage, and only the PSU protocols based on additively homomor- phic encryption (AHE) can avoid the leakage. However, the AHE-based PSU protocols are far from being practical. To bridge the gap, we also design a new PSU protocol that can avoid the unnecessary leakage. Unlike the AHE- based PSU protocols, our new construction only relies on symmetric-key operations other than base OTs, thereby being much more scalable. The experimental results demonstrate that our protocol can obtain at least 873.74× speedup over the best-performing AHE-based scheme. Moreover, our per- formance is comparable to that of the state-of-the-art PSU protocol (Chen et al., USENIX Security 2023), which also suffers from the unnecessary leakage. 
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