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1. Start-ups, job creation, and founder characteristics

   https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtz030  

   Brown, J. David; Earle, John S.; Kim, Mee Jung; Lee, Kyung Min (July 2019, Industrial and Corporate Change)

   Abstract Analyzing data on all US employers in a cohort of entering firms, we document a highly skewed size distribution, such that the largest 5% account for over half of cohort employment at firm birth and more than two-thirds at firm age 7. Analyzing linked survey-administrative data, we find that female, African–American, and younger founders are initially less likely to start large firms. The gender gap persists through firm age 7, while racial and age gaps do not. Education is positively associated with start-up size, except for graduate degrees. Prior entrepreneurship and founding team size are positively associated, but team diversity is not. Specifications with capital and industry controls illuminate roles of financial constraints and sectoral choice. 

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2. Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries

   https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180555  

   Akcigit, Ufuk; Alp, Harun; Peters, Michael (January 2021, American Economic Review)

   null (Ed.)

   Delegating managerial tasks is essential for firm growth. Most firms in developing countries, however, do not hire outside managers but instead rely on family members. In this paper, we ask if this lack of managerial delegation can explain why firms in poor countries are small and whether it has important aggregate consequences. We construct a model of firm growth where entrepreneurs have a fixed time endowment to run their daily operations. As firms grow large, the need to hire outside managers increases. Firms’ willingness to expand therefore depends on the ease with which delegation can take place. We calibrate the model to plant-level data from the United States and India. We identify the key parameters of our theory by targeting the experimental evidence on the effect of managerial practices on firm performance from Bloom et al. (2013). We find that inefficiencies in the delegation environment account for 11 percent of the income per capita difference between the United States and India. They also contribute to the small size of Indian producers, but would cause substantially more harm for US firms. The reason is that US firms are larger on average and managerial delegation is especially valuable for large firms, thus making delegation efficiency and other factors affecting firm growth complements. (JEL D22, G32, L25, L26, O14) 

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3. Imports, Exports, and Earnings Inequality: Measures of Exposure and Estimates of Incidence

   https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac012  

   Adão, Rodrigo; Carrillo, Paul; Costinot, Arnaud; Donaldson, Dave; Pomeranz, Dina (March 2022, The Quarterly Journal of Economics)

   Abstract The earnings of individuals depend on the demand for the factor services they supply. International trade may therefore affect earnings inequality because either (i) foreign consumers and firms demand domestic factor services in different proportions than domestic consumers and firms do, an export channel; or (ii) domestic consumers and firms change their demand for domestic factor services in response to the availability of foreign goods, an import channel. Building on this idea, we develop new measures of export and import exposure at the individual level and provide estimates of their incidence across the earnings distribution. The key input fed into our empirical analysis is a unique administrative data set from Ecuador that merges firm-to-firm transaction data, employer-employee matched data, owner-firm matched data, and firm-level customs transaction records. We find that export exposure is pro-middle class, import exposure is pro-rich, and in terms of overall incidence, the import channel is the dominant force. As a result, earnings inequality in Ecuador is higher than it would be in the absence of trade. 

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4. Optimal Taxation and R&D Policies

   https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA15445  

   Akcigit, Ufuk; Hanley, Douglas; Stantcheva, Stefanie (January 2022, Econometrica)

   We study the optimal design of corporate taxation and R&D policies as a dynamic mechanism design problem with spillovers. Firms have heterogeneous research productivity, and that research productivity is private information. There are non‐internalized technological spillovers across firms, but the asymmetric information prevents the government from correcting them in the first best way. We highlight that key parameters for the optimal policies are (i) the relative complementarities between observable R&D investments, unobservable R&D inputs, and firm research productivity, (ii) the dispersion and persistence of firms' research productivities, and (iii) the magnitude of technological spillovers across firms. We estimate our model using firm‐level data matched to patent data and quantify the optimal policies. In the data, high research productivity firms get disproportionately higher returns to R&D investments than lower productivity firms. Very simple innovation policies, such as linear corporate taxes combined with a nonlinear R&D subsidy—which provides lower marginal subsidies at higher R&D levels—can do almost as well as the unrestricted optimal policies. Our formulas and theoretical and numerical methods are more broadly applicable to the provision of firm incentives in dynamic settings with asymmetric information and spillovers, and to firm taxation more generally. 

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5. An Impulse-Regime Switching Game Model of Vertical Competition

   https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00381-4  

   Aïd, René; Campi, Luciano; Li, Liangchen; Ludkovski, Mike (March 2021, Dynamic Games and Applications)

   null (Ed.)

   Abstract We study a new kind of nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls, motivated by strategic competition in commodity markets. A representative upstream firm produces a commodity that is used by a representative downstream firm to produce a final consumption good. Both firms can influence the price of the commodity. By shutting down or increasing generation capacities, the upstream firm influences the price with impulses. By switching (or not) to a substitute, the downstream firm influences the drift of the commodity price process. We study the resulting impulse-regime switching game between the two firms, focusing on explicit threshold-type equilibria. Remarkably, this class of games naturally gives rise to multiple potential Nash equilibria, which we obtain thanks to a verification-based approach. We exhibit three candidate types of equilibria depending on the ultimate number of switches by the downstream firm (zero, one or an infinite number of switches). We illustrate the diversification effect provided by vertical integration in the specific case of the crude oil market. Our analysis shows that the diversification gains strongly depend on the pass-through from the crude price to the gasoline price. 

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