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This content will become publicly available on January 13, 2026

Title: On the Privacy of Sublinear-Communication Jaccard Index Estimation via Min-hash
The min-hash sketch is a well-known technique for low-communication approximation of the Jaccard index between two input sets. Moreover, there is a folklore belief that min-hash sketch-based protocols protect the privacy of the inputs. In this paper, we consider variants of private min-hash sketch based-protocols and investigate this folklore to quantify the privacy of the min-hash sketch. We begin our investigation by presenting a highly-efficient two-party protocol for estimating the Jaccard index while ensuring differential privacy. This protocol adds Laplacian noise to the min-hash sketch counts to provide privacy protection. Then, we aim to understand what privacy, if any, is guaranteed if the results of the min-hash are released without any additional noise, such as in the case of historical data. We begin our investigation by considering the privacy of min-hash in a centralized setting where the hash functions are chosen by the min-hash functionality and are unknown to the participants. We show that in this case the min-hash output satisfies the standard definition of differential privacy (DP) without any additional noise. We next consider a more practical distributed setting, where the hash function must be shared among all parties and is typically public. Unfortunately, we show that in this public hash function setting, the min-hash output is no longer DP. We therefore consider the notion of distributional differential privacy (DDP) introduced by Bassily et al. (FOCS 2013). We show that if the honest party's set has sufficiently high min-entropy, the min-hash output achieves DDP without requiring noise. Our findings provide guidance on how to use the min-hash sketch for private Jaccard index estimation and clarify the extent to which min-hash protocols protect input privacy, refining the common belief in their privacy guarantees.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1955620 2144798
PAR ID:
10584475
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
International Association for Cryptologic Research
Date Published:
Journal Name:
IACR Communications in Cryptology
Volume:
1
Issue:
4
ISSN:
3006-5496
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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