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A framework is presented for understanding how misinformation shapes decision-making, which has cognitive representations of gist at its core. I discuss how the framework goes beyond prior work, and how it can be implemented so that valid scientific messages are more likely to be effective, remembered, and shared through social media, while misinformation is resisted. The distinction between mental representations of the rote facts of a message—its verbatim representation—and its gist explains several paradoxes, including the frequent disconnect between knowing facts and, yet, making decisions that seem contrary to those facts. Decision makers can falsely remember the gist as seen or heard even when they remember verbatim facts. Indeed, misinformation can be more compelling than information when it provides an interpretation of reality that makes better sense than the facts. Consequently, for many issues, scientific information and misinformation are in a battle for the gist. A fuzzy-processing preference for simple gist explains expectations for antibiotics, the spread of misinformation about vaccination, and responses to messages about global warming, nuclear proliferation, and natural disasters. The gist, which reflects knowledge and experience, induces emotions and brings to mind social values. However, changing mental representations is not sufficient by itself; gist representations must be connected to values. The policy choice is not simply between constraining behavior or persuasion—there is another option. Science communication needs to shift from an emphasis on disseminating rote facts to achieving insight, retaining its integrity but without shying away from emotions and values.
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This content will become publicly available on December 9, 2025
The Psychology of Misinformation Across the Lifespan
Ubiquitous misinformation on social media threatens the health and well-being of young people. We review research on susceptibility to misinformation, why it spreads, and how these mechanisms might operate developmentally. Although we identify many research gaps, results suggest that cognitive ability, thinking styles, and metacognitive scrutiny of misinformation are protective, but early adverse experiences can bias information processing and sow seeds of mistrust. We find that content knowledge is not sufficient to protect against misinformation, but that it, along with life experiences, provides a foundation for gist plausibility (true in principle, rather than true at the level of verbatim details) that likely determines whether misinformation is accepted and shared. Thus, we present a theoretical framework based on fuzzy-trace theory that integrates the following: knowledge that distinguishes verbatim facts from gist (knowledge that is amplified by cognitive faculties and derived from trusted sources); personality as an information-processing filter colored by experiences; emotion as a product of interpreting the gist of information; and ideology that changes prior probabilities and gist interpretations of what is plausible. The young and the old may be at greatest risk because of their prioritization of social goals, a need that social media algorithms are designed to meet but at the cost of widespread exposure to misinformation.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2229885
- PAR ID:
- 10598127
- Publisher / Repository:
- Annual Review of Developmental Psychology
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Annual Review of Developmental Psychology
- Volume:
- 6
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 2640-7922
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 425 to 454
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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