Preference aggregation mechanisms help decision-makers combine diverse preference rankings produced by multiple voters into a single consensus ranking. Prior work has developed methods for aggregating multiple rankings into a fair consensus over the same set of candidates. Yet few real-world problems present themselves as such precisely formulated aggregation tasks with each voter fully ranking all candidates. Instead, preferences are often expressed as rankings over partial and even disjoint subsets of candidates. For instance, hiring committee members typically opt to rank their top choices instead of exhaustively ordering every single job applicant. However, the existing literature does not offer a framework for characterizing nor ensuring group fairness in such partial preference aggregation tasks. Unlike fully ranked settings, partial preferences imply both a selection decision of whom to rank plus an ordering decision of how to rank the selected candidates. Our work fills this gap by conceptualizing the open problem of fair partial preference aggregation. We introduce an impossibility result for fair selection from partial preferences and design a computational framework showing how we can navigate this obstacle. Inspired by Single Transferable Voting, our proposed solution PreFair produces consensus rankings that are fair in the selection of candidates and also in their relative ordering. Our experimental study demonstrates that PreFair achieves the best performance in this dual fairness objective compared to state-of-the-art alternatives adapted to this new problem while still satisfying voter preferences. 
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                    This content will become publicly available on June 23, 2026
                            
                            Group Fair Rated Preference Aggregation: Ties Are (Mostly) All You Need
                        
                    
    
            Rated preference aggregation is conventionally performed by averaging ratings from multiple evaluators to create a consensus ordering of candidates from highest to lowest average rating. Ideally, the consensus is fair, meaning critical opportunities are not withheld from marginalized groups of candidates, even if group biases may be present in the to-be-combined ratings. Prior work operationalizing fairness in preference aggregation is limited to settings where evaluators provide rankings of candidates (e.g., Joe > Jack > Jill). Yet, in practice, many evaluators assign ratings such as Likert scales or categories (e.g., yes, no, maybe) to each candidate. Ratings convey different information than rankings leading to distinct fairness issues during their aggregation. The existing literature does not characterize these fairness concerns nor provide applicable bias-mitigation solutions. Unlike the ranked setting studied previously, two unique forms of bias arise in rating aggregation. First, biased rating stems from group disparities in to-be-aggregated evaluator ratings. Second, biased tie-breaking occurs because ties in average ratings must be resolved when aggregating ratings into a consensus ranking, and this tie-breaking act can unfairly advantage certain groups. To address this gap, we define the open fair rated preference aggregation problem and introduce the corresponding Fate methodology. Fate offers the first group fairness metric specifically for rated preference data. We propose two Fate algorithms. Fate-Break works in settings when ties need to be broken, explicitly fairness-enhancing such processes without lowering consensus utility. Fate-Rate mitigates disparities in how groups are rated, by using a Markov-chain approach to generate outcomes where groups are, in as much as possible, equally represented. Our experimental study illustrates the FATE methods provide the most bias-mitigation compared to adapting prior methods to fair tie-breaking and rating aggregation. 
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                            - Award ID(s):
- 2007932
- PAR ID:
- 10634927
- Publisher / Repository:
- ACM ( conference FAccT ’25)
- Date Published:
- ISSN:
- 979-8-4007-1482-5/25/06
- ISBN:
- 9798400714825
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 660 to 678
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- • Computing methodologies • Social and professional topics →User characteristics
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Athens Greece
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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