Cybercafes remain a popular way to access the Internet in the developing world as many users still lack access to personal computers. Coupled with the recent digitization of government services, e.g. in Kenya, many users have turned to cybercafes to access essential services. Many of these users may have never used a computer, and face significant security and privacy issues at cybercafes. Yet, these challenges as well as the advice offered remain largely unexplored. We investigate these challenges along with the security advice and support provided by the operators at cybercafes in Kenya through n = 36 semi-structured interviews (n = 14 with cybercafe managers and n = 22 with customers). We find that cybercafes serve a crucial role in Kenya by enabling access to printing and government services. However, most customers face challenges with computer usage as well as security and usability challenges with account creation and password management. As a workaround, customers often rely on the support and advice of cybercafe managers who mostly direct them to use passwords that are memorable, e.g. simply using their national ID numbers or names. Some managers directly manage passwords for their customers, with one even using the same password for all their customers. These results suggest the need for more awareness about phone-based password managers, as well as a need for computer training and security awareness among these users. There is also a need to explore security and privacy advice beyond Western peripheries to support broader populations
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This content will become publicly available on September 3, 2026
A Large-Scale Survey of Password Entry Practices on Non-Desktop Devices
Users continue to authenticate on a wide range of devices. Logging into such devices is often complex due to factors related to the variety of devices used and because of passwords. While passwords can present a challenge for users—especially in creating secure passwords—password managers can help users generate and store passwords. However, research has shown that users avoid generating passwords, often giving the rationale that it is difficult to enter generated passwords on devices without a password manager. In this paper, we conduct a survey (n = 999) of individuals from the US, UK, and Europe, exploring the range of devices on which they enter passwords and the challenges associated with password entry on those devices. We find that password entry on devices without password managers is a common occurrence and comes with significant usability challenges that often lead users to weaken their passwords to increase the ease of entry. We conclude this paper by discussing how future research could address these challenges and encourage users to adopt generated passwords.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2226404
- PAR ID:
- 10639124
- Publisher / Repository:
- ACM
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies
- Volume:
- 9
- Issue:
- 3
- ISSN:
- 2474-9567
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1 to 30
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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