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The 2024–25 judicial reform in Mexico represents one of the most sweeping overhauls of a national judiciary in recent history. The reform replaced nearly all federal and state judges through direct popular elections, restructured the country’s highest court, and created new administrative and disciplinary bodies that expanded political influence over judicial decision-making. Here, in a conversation with Judicature International, AMANDA DRISCOLL, the Dr. J. Elizabeth Garraway Professor of Political Science at Florida State University, MICHAEL J. NELSON, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Penn State, and JULIO RÍOS-FIGUEROA, Professor of Law at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City, bring their expertise on comparative judicial politics and the Mexican legal system. They analyze the design, implementation, and consequences of these reforms, assessing what they reveal about judicial independence, democratic legitimacy, and the potential risks of politicizing the judiciary.
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Mexico’s Judicial Elections and the Politics of Reform
The 2024–25 judicial reform in Mexico represents one of the most sweeping overhauls of a national judiciary in recent history. The reform replaced nearly all federal and state judges through direct popular elections, restructured the country’s highest court, and created new administrative and disciplinary bodies that expanded political influence over judicial decision-making. Here, in a conversation with Judicature International, AMANDA DRISCOLL, the Dr. J. Elizabeth Garraway Professor of Political Science at Florida State University, MICHAEL J.NELSON, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Penn State, and JULIO RÍOS-FIGUEROA, Professor of Law at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de M(ITAM) in Mexico City, bring their expertise on comparative judicial politics and the Mexican legal system. They analyze the design, implementation, and consequences of these reforms, assessing what they reveal about judicial independence, democratic legitimacy, and the potential risks of politicizing the judiciary.
more »
« less
- Award ID(s):
- 2501294
- PAR ID:
- 10662663
- Publisher / Repository:
- Judicature International
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Judicature
- ISSN:
- 0022-5800
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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