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Microarchitectural side-channels enable an attacker to exfiltrate information via the observable side-effects of a victim’s execution. Obfuscating mitigation schemes have recently gained in popularity for their appealing performance characteristics. These schemes, including randomized caches and DRAM traffic shapers, limit, but do not completely eliminate, side-channel leakage. An important (yet under-explored) research challenge is the quantitative study of the security effectiveness of these schemes, identifying whether these obfuscating schemes help increase the security level of a system, and if so, by how much. In this paper, we address this research challenge by presenting Metior, a comprehensive model to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of obfuscating side-channel mitigations. Metior offers a way to reason about the flow of information through obfuscating schemes. Metior builds upon existing information theoretic approaches, allowing for the comprehensive side-channel leakage evaluation of active attackers, real victim applications, and state-ofthe-art microarchitectural obfuscation schemes. We demonstrate the use of Metior in the concrete leakage evaluation of three microarchitectural obfuscation schemes (fully-associative random replacement caches, CEASER-S, and Camouflage), identifying unintuitive leakage behaviours across all three schemes.more » « less
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null (Ed.)Analytic workloads on terabyte data-sets are often run in the cloud, where application and storage servers are separate and connected via network. In order to saturate the storage bandwidth and to hide the long storage latency, such a solution requires an expensive server cluster with sufficient aggregate DRAM capacity and hardware threads. An alternative solution is to push the query computation into storage servers. In this paper we present an in-storage Analytics QUery Offloading MAchiNe (AQUOMAN) to “offload” most SQL operators, including multi-way joins, to SSDs. AQUOMAN executes Table Tasks, which apply a static dataflow graph of SQL operators to relational tables to produce an output table. Table Tasks use a streaming computation model, which allows AQUOMAN to process queries with a reasonable amount of DRAM for intermediate results. AQUOMAN is a general analytic query processor, which can be integrated in the database software stack transparently. We have built a prototype of AQUOMAN in FPGAs, and using TPC-H benchmarks on 1TB data sets, shown that a single instance of 1TB AQUOMAN disk, on average, can free up 70% CPU cycles and reduce DRAM usage by 60%. One way to visualize this saving is to think that if we run queries sequentially and ignore inter-query page cache reuse, MonetDB running on a 4-core, 16GB-DRAM machine with AQUOMAN augmented SSDs performs, on average, as well as a MonetDB running on a 32-core, 128GB-DRAM machine with standard SSDs.more » « less
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