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This paper addresses volume leakage (i.e., leakage of the number of records in the answer set) when processing keyword queries in encrypted key-value (KV) datasets. Volume leakage, coupled with prior knowledge about data distribution and/or previously executed queries, can reveal both ciphertexts and current user queries. We develop a solution to prevent volume leakage, entitled Veil, that partitions the dataset by randomly mapping keys to a set of equi-sized buckets. Veil provides a tunable mechanism for data owners to explore a trade-off between storage and communication overheads. To make buckets indistinguishable to the adversary, Veil uses a novel padding strategy that allow buckets to overlap, reducing the need to add fake records. Both theoretical and experimental results show Veil to significantly outperform existing state-of-the-art. 

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We investigate the practical aspects of computing the necessary and possible winners in elections over incomplete voter preferences. In the case of the necessary winners, we show how to implement and accelerate the polynomial-time algorithm of Xia and Conitzer. In the case of the possible winners, where the problem is NP-hard, we give a natural reduction to Integer Linear Programming (ILP) for all positional scoring rules and implement it in a leading commercial optimization solver. Further, we devise optimization techniques to minimize the number of ILP executions and, oftentimes, avoid them altogether. We conduct a thorough experimental study that includes the construction of a rich benchmark of election data based on real and synthetic data. Our findings suggest that, the worst-case intractability of the possible winners notwithstanding, the algorithmic techniques presented here scale well and can be used to compute the possible winners in realistic scenarios.