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Taking a cue from remarks Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within the British philosophical context of the 1950s and early 1960s when ordinary language philosophy’s influence was at its peak. Specifically, I make the case that the ordinary language philosophers’ methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation and that these criticisms are related to the historical turn in philosophy of science. I think such connections are especially clear in the work of Stephen Toulmin, who taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on explanation under Gilbert Ryle in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse’s appeal to an ordinary language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models in scientific reasoning. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception.