- Home
- Search Results
- Page 1 of 1
Search for: All records
-
Total Resources2
- Resource Type
-
0000000002000000
- More
- Availability
-
20
- Author / Contributor
- Filter by Author / Creator
-
-
Sher, Shlomi (2)
-
Leong, Lim (1)
-
McKenzie, Craig R. (1)
-
McKenzie, Craig_R_M (1)
-
Müller-Trede, Johannes (1)
-
#Tyler Phillips, Kenneth E. (0)
-
#Willis, Ciara (0)
-
& Abreu-Ramos, E. D. (0)
-
& Abramson, C. I. (0)
-
& Abreu-Ramos, E. D. (0)
-
& Adams, S.G. (0)
-
& Ahmed, K. (0)
-
& Ahmed, Khadija. (0)
-
& Aina, D.K. Jr. (0)
-
& Akcil-Okan, O. (0)
-
& Akuom, D. (0)
-
& Aleven, V. (0)
-
& Andrews-Larson, C. (0)
-
& Archibald, J. (0)
-
& Arnett, N. (0)
-
- Filter by Editor
-
-
& Spizer, S. M. (0)
-
& . Spizer, S. (0)
-
& Ahn, J. (0)
-
& Bateiha, S. (0)
-
& Bosch, N. (0)
-
& Brennan K. (0)
-
& Brennan, K. (0)
-
& Chen, B. (0)
-
& Chen, Bodong (0)
-
& Drown, S. (0)
-
& Ferretti, F. (0)
-
& Higgins, A. (0)
-
& J. Peters (0)
-
& Kali, Y. (0)
-
& Ruiz-Arias, P.M. (0)
-
& S. Spitzer (0)
-
& Sahin. I. (0)
-
& Spitzer, S. (0)
-
& Spitzer, S.M. (0)
-
(submitted - in Review for IEEE ICASSP-2024) (0)
-
-
Have feedback or suggestions for a way to improve these results?
!
Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher.
Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?
Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.
-
The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez’s insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.more » « less
-
Sher, Shlomi; McKenzie, Craig_R_M; Müller-Trede, Johannes; Leong, Lim (, Current Directions in Psychological Science)Human decisions are context dependent in ways that violate classical norms of rational choice. However, these norms implicitly depend on idealized descriptive assumptions that are often unrealistic. We focus on one such assumption: that information is constant across contexts. Choice contexts often supply subtle cues—which may be embedded in frames, procedures, or menus—to which human decision makers can be highly sensitive. We review recent evidence that some important context effects reflect dynamically coherent belief and preference updating, in response to ecologically valid cues. This evidence paints a more nuanced picture of human rationality in natural choice environments and opens up prospects for nonpaternalistic forms of choice architecture.more » « less
An official website of the United States government

Full Text Available