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Creators/Authors contains: "Sprinkle, Jonathan"

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  1. In order to develop custom controllers intended to operate vehicles on a live highway, a series of data collection-focused tests were performed at increasing stages of complexity. Modern vehicles with features like Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) feature a rich set of sensors and drive-by-wire mechanisms. The presented stages of data collection begins with the analysis of raw data provided by various vehicles, and eventually results in spoofing Controller Area Network (CAN) protocols for sending control commands to operate a vehicle. This paper covers the data and technical efforts needed at various stages. The raw data and tools to plot the data are also publicly available.
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 1, 2023
  2. This paper experimentally tests an implementation of a control barrier function (CBF) designed to guarantee a minimum time-gap in car following on an automated vehicle (AV) in live traffic, with a majority occurring on freeways. The CBF supervises a nominal unsafe PID controller on the AV’s velocity. The experimental testing spans two months of driving, of which 1.9 hours of data is collected in which the CBF and nominal controller are active. We find that violations of the guaranteed minimum time-gap are observed, as measured by the vehicle’s on-board radar unit. There are two distinct causes of the violations. First, in multi-lane traffic, Cut-ins from other vehicles represent external disturbances that can immediately violate the minimum guaranteed time gap provided by the CBF. When cut-ins occur, the CBF does eventually return the vehicle to a safe time gap. Second, even when cut-ins do not occur, system model inaccuracies (e.g., sensor error and delay, actuator error and delay) can lead to violations of the minimum time-gap. These violations are small relative to the violations that would have occurred using only the unsafe nominal control law.
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 1, 2023