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ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the problem of capital provision in a large particle system modeled by stochastic differential equations involving hitting times, which arises from considerations of systemic risk in a financial network. Motivated by Tang and Tsai, we focus on the number or proportion of surviving entities that never default to measure the systemic robustness. First we show that the mean‐field particle system and its limit McKean–Vlasov equation are both well‐posed by virtue of the notion of minimal solutions. We then establish a connection between the proportion of surviving entities in the large particle system and the probability of default in the McKean–Vlasov equation as the size of the interacting particle system tends to infinity. Finally, we study the asymptotic efficiency of capital provision for different drift , which is linked to the economy regime: The expected number of surviving entities has a uniform upper bound if ; it is of order if ; and it is of order if , where the effect of capital provision is negligible. 

Preference tuning is a crucial process for aligning deep generative models with human preferences. This survey offers a thorough overview of recent advancements in preference tuning and the integration of human feedback. The paper is organized into three main sections: 1) introduction and preliminaries: an introduction to reinforcement learning frameworks, preference tuning tasks, models, and datasets across various modalities: language, speech, and vision, as well as different policy approaches, 2) in-depth exploration of each preference tuning approach: a detailed analysis of the methods used in preference tuning, and 3) applications, discussion, and future directions: an exploration of the applications of preference tuning in downstream tasks, including evaluation methods for different modalities, and an outlook on future research directions. Our objective is to present the latest methodologies in preference tuning and model alignment, enhancing the understanding of this field for researchers and practitioners. We hope to encourage further engagement and innovation in this area. Additionally, we provide a GitHub link https://github.com/hanyang1999/Preference-Tuning-with-Human-Feedback. 

We propose and study a new class of polynomial voting rules for a general decentralized decision/consensus system, and more specifically for the proof-of-stake protocol. The main idea, inspired by the Penrose square-root law and the more recent quadratic voting rule, is to differentiate a voter’s voting power and the voter’s share (fraction of the total in the system). We show that, whereas voter shares form a martingale process that converges to a Dirichlet distribution, their voting powers follow a supermartingale process that decays to zero over time. This prevents any voter from controlling the voting process and, thus, enhances security. For both limiting results, we also provide explicit rates of convergence. When the initial total volume of votes (or stakes) is large, we show a phase transition in share stability (or the lack thereof), corresponding to the voter’s initial share relative to the total. We also study the scenario in which trading (of votes/stakes) among the voters is allowed and quantify the level of risk sensitivity (or risk aversion) in three categories, corresponding to the voter’s utility being a supermartingale, a submartingale, and a martingale. For each category, we identify the voter’s best strategy in terms of participation and trading. Funding: W. Tang gratefully acknowledges financial support through the National Science Foundation [Grants DMS-2113779 and DMS-2206038] and through a start-up grant at Columbia University. D. D. Yao’s work is part of a Columbia–City University/Hong Kong collaborative project that is supported by InnoHK Initiative, the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the Laboratory for AI-Powered Financial Technologies.