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Buildings produce a significant share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, making homes and businesses a major factor in climate change. To address this critical challenge, this paper explores achieving net-zero emission through the carbon-aware optimal scheduling of the multi-energy building integrated energy systems (BIES). We integrate advanced technologies and strategies, such as the carbon capture system (CCS), power-to-gas (P2G), carbon tracking, and emission allowance trading, into the traditional BIES scheduling problem. The proposed model enables accurate accounting of carbon emissions associated with building energy systems and facilitates the implementation of low-carbon operations. Furthermore, to address the challenge of accurately assessing uncertainty sets related to forecasting errors of loads, generation, and carbon intensity, we develop a learning-based robust optimization approach for BIES that is robust in the presence of uncertainty and guarantees statistical feasibility. The proposed approach comprises a shape learning stage and a shape calibration stage to generate an optimal uncertainty set that ensures favorable results from a statistical perspective. Numerical studies conducted based on both synthetic and real-world datasets have demonstrated that the approach yields up to 8.2% cost reduction, compared with conventional methods, in assisting buildings to robustly reach net-zero emissions. 

The sharing economy has upset the market for housing and transportation services. Homeowners can rent out their property when they are away on vacation, car owners can offer ridesharing services. These sharing economy business models are based on monetizing under-utilized infrastructure. They are enabled by peer-to-peer platforms that match eager sellers with willing buyers. Are there compelling sharing economy opportunities in the electricity sector? What products or services can be shared in tomorrow’s Smart Grid? We begin by exploring sharing economy opportunities in the electricity sector, and discuss regulatory and technical obstacles to these opportunities. We then study the specific problem of a collection of firms sharing their electricity storage. We characterize equilibrium prices for shared storage in a spot market. We formulate storage investment decisions of the firms as a non-convex non-cooperative game. We show that under a mild alignment condition, a Nash equilibrium exists, it is unique, and it supports the social welfare. We discuss technology platforms necessary for the physical exchange of power, and market platforms necessary to trade electricity storage. We close with synthetic examples to illustrate our ideas.