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The vulnerabilities of information and communica-tion technology (ICT) infrastructures leave room for cyber attacks threatening the reliable operations of power systems. Based on the real-world evidence of the Ukraine power grid attack and the pop-ular technical discussion that cyber attacks could be launched at the control-center level, this paper reveals a new attack strategy: model-measurement data integrity (MMI) attack. Instead of com-promising measurements only, we investigate the possibility where network parameters are coordinately manipulated when con-structing false data injection attack (FDIA) vectors. Furthermore, we model cyber adversaries possible behavior of co-planning the manipulated measurement channels and parameter attack vectors prior to the launch of FDIAs. The revealed MMI attack strategy allows a drastic reduction of measurement channels to compro-mise in run-time for keeping the stealth property. Simulations in the IEEE 14-bus test system and the IEEE 118-bus test system demonstrate the feasibility of the revealed MMI attack strategy.

Monolayer molybdenum di-selenide (1L-MoSe 2 ) stands out in the transition metal dichalcogenide family of materials as an outlier where optical generation of valley polarization is inefficient. Here we show that using charge doping in conjunction with an external magnetic field, the valley polarization of 1L-MoSe 2 can be controlled effectively. Most remarkably, the valley polarization can be tuned to negative values, where the higher energy Zeeman mode emission is more intense than the lower energy one. Our experimental observations are interpreted with valley-selective exciton-charge dressing that manifests when gate induced doping populates predominantly one valley in the presence of Zeeman splitting.